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THEORIES, ASSUMPTIONS, AND SECURITIES REGULATION:
MARKET EFFICIENCY REVISITED
DONALD C. LANGEVOORTt
The efficient market hypothesis has a strong presence in the
contemporary culture of securities regulation. Its central insight-
that a variety of forces impound available information into stock
prices fast enough that arbitrage opportunities cannot be exploited
systematically'-began as an important theory in the economics
literature.2 Later, it became a working tool for legal scholars, and
then diffused into law as both the SEC and the courts began to cite
it as authority for a variety of concepts and initiatives. Judge Frank
Easterbrook was able to write in a recent opinion, without qualifica-
tion, that "[t]he Securities and Exchange Commission believes that
markets correctly value the securities of well-followed firms, so that
new sales may rely on information that has been digested and
expressed in the security's price."
3
t Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. The
author thanks Bill Wang, Lou Lowenstein, and Joel Seligman for their helpful
suggestions.
The seminal article on the efficiency hypothesis as a legal construct is RonaldJ.
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficienty, 70 VA. L. REV.
549 (1984). In essence, the hypothesis posits that there will be an identity between
two equilibria: securities prices and asset values. See id. at 557-58; see also William
H. Beaver, Market Efficiency, 56 AccT. REv. 23, 27-33 (1981) (defining market
efficiency, and identifying its attributes and associated theories).
To test the equilibria hypothesis, a plausible model for asset prices must be
developed and the presence of exploitable arbitrage opportunities must be explored.
Therefore, tests that support efficiency are typically tests of the speed at which
arbitrage opportunities presented by new information disappear. See Steven A. Ross,
The Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Theoretical Perspectives, 77 AM. ECON. REv.
29, 32-33 (1987). This creates the problem that an improperly constructed asset
model may cause the data to deviate from the hypothesis.
2 Paul Samuelson is generally credited with the most formal exposition of the
hypothesis as understood today. See Paul A. Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated
Prices Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REv. 41 (1965). There is, however, general
agreement that its history is much longer. See Louis Bachelier, Theoiy of Speculation,
in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 17, 17 (Paul H. Cootner ed.,
1964). See generally Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and Martingales, 27J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1583, 1583-88 (1989) (providing a comprehensive history of the
efficient markets literature, albeit by an author who is a critic of the efficiency
hypothesis).
3 Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis added); see Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice
Institutional Rhetoric and theProcess of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527,
538 (1990). For a full discussion of this case, see infra notes 196-202 and accompany-
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The acceptance of such an idea by the legal elite makes it easy
to forget just how foreign market efficiency is in wider circles.
Billions of dollars are spent to generate securities research,
recommendations, and advice. The popular image of the securities
markets is one of a noisy crowd easily manipulated by and hyper-
sensitive to rumors and fads.4 Best-selling books like Liar's Poker
portray traders who see their jobs more as tests of virility than of
intellect, selling to customers (even professional ones) who live in
perpetual states of confusion. Practicing lawyers and others familiar
with the day-to-day workings of the securities business are often
more than happy to offer impressions of traders and their firms
driven more by momentous ego or mindless bureaucracy than by
rationality. It may be entertaining to watch or even participate in
the process of investing, but saying that it coldly and reliably
produces correct pricing, they suggest, manifests an awfully
minimalist definition of correct.
This popular account is overdrawn, of course. Economists and
legal scholars properly dismiss such expressions as anecdotal and
popularized, albeit intriguing in their persistence.6 The validity of
the efficient market hypothesis is based on a set of statistical tests
demonstrating that the market prices securities as tf there was a
rational process, whether or not the market's constituent actors
qualify as rational. The testing done in the 1960s and early 1970s,
associated largely with finance theorist Eugene Fama,7 supported
ing text. As an academic, of course, Easterbrook is well-known for his strong
efficiency views. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YAi LJ. 698, 723-31 (1982) (discussing efficiency considerations of
freeze-out transactions).
4 The interest in biotechnology stocks in the early 1980s is a good example of
such a fad. For an engaging exploration of the rise and fall of these stocks, see
ROBERT TEITELMAN, GENE DREAMS (1989).
5 MICHAEL M. LEWIS, LIAR'S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL
STREET (1989).
6 Economists have long wondered about the efficiency paradox-that the existence
of a high degree of efficiency depends on a critical mass of persons believing that it
is worthwhile to try to beat the market, notwithstanding the model's teachings.
Today, it is widely accepted that markets do not achieve perfect efficiency; they offer
positive returns to participants so as to justify their continued presence. See, e.g.,
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 622-25 (offering a resolution of the efficiency
paradox); SanfordJ. Grossman &Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility ofInformation-
ally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980) (arguing that "because
information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the information which is available,
since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would receive no compensa-
tion").
7 See generally EUGENE F. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133-68 (1976)
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the idea that arbitrage opportunities were minimal: markets exhibit
a sufficiently high degree of efficiency so that any residual imperfec-
tions can safely be treated as trivial. In 1978, Michael Jensen stated
(in a quotation destined to live a long and useful life) that "there is
no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical
evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis."8 For
many legal scholars, this said enough.9 At roughly this point, the
hypothesis began its remarkably quick transition from theory into
doctrine.
The story, however, has since undergone a plot twist. In the
1980s, using more sophisticated data sets and computer technology,
a number of economists began to question the accuracy of the tests
that were thought to validate the efficiency model. Doubts were
raised about the baseline model of asset value used to test for
arbitrage opportunities. Statistical properties inconsistent with the
model's predictions-excess volatility relative to expectations about
changes in dividends, and tendencies of prices to revert to mean-
were documented. Various pricing anomalies were identified and
[hereinafter FAMA, FOUNDATIONS] (discussing efficient capital markets and models of
market equilibrium); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient CapitalMarkets: A Review of Theory and
Empirical Work, 25J. FIN. 383, 383, 416 (1970) (reviewing theoretical and empirical
literature on the efficient markets model and concluding that the model holds well).
Fama is well known for his three-part typology of efficiency testing. The so-called
weak form of the hypothesis is that prior price movements cannot systematically be
used to make predictions of future changes. The semi-strong form is that publicly
available information cannot be so used. The strong form is that no informational
access will systematically confer a trading advantage. See id. at 388. Today, the strong
form has largely been falsified; insider status, for example, is presumed to give one
a trading advantage. Most legal writing today focuses on the semi-strong form.
Worth noting, however, is that the weak form is still a matter of interest and the
subject of continued testing.
8 Michael C.Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence RegardingMarket Efficiency, 6J. FIN.
EcoN. 95, 95 (1978). Jensen repeated his assertion in the mid-1980s, stating that
"there is no better documented proposition in any of the social sciences." Michael
C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J.,
Summer 1986, at 6, 11. This statement could be taken as a comment on either the
efficiency hypothesis or the social sciences.
9 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theoy, the Market for Corporate
Contro4 and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978) (arguing
"that efficient capital market theory undermines the supposedjustification for current
tender offer regulation and legal defensive tactics available to target company
management"); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theoy in Securities Fraud
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAw. 1, 3-5 (1982) [hereinafter
Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theoy] (explaining the market model and stating that
"[b]ecause all publicly available information is embedded in stock prices, investors
who accept the market price are fully protected [and] no better off with more
disclosure nor worse off with less disclosure").
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found to be persistent. As the controversy intensified, theorists
began seriously to question whether the efficient market model
could ever really be validated or discredited.
This ferment has led to a counterreaction to the efficient market
hypothesis within the economics profession. A group of eminent
theorists believes that "noise"-pricing influences not associated with
rational expectations about asset values-plays a far greater role than
previously thought in stock market behavior. They are developing
alternative models of price behavior that assume prices do make
significant departures from asset values. Although their formal
efforts are still in early stages, they have made the idea of strong
capital market efficiency a legitimately debatable issue. In the
words of two well-known noise theory proponents, Andrei Shleifer
and Lawrence Summers: "If the efficient markets hypothesis was a
publicly traded security, its price would be enormously volatile....
[T]he stock in the [conventional] hypothesis... crashed along with
the rest of the market on October 19, 1987. Its recovery has been
less dramatic than that of the rest of the market."
10
This Article focuses on the gulf that has developed between the
current economics literature and the persistent, seemingly static,
conception of market efficiency in the legal culture. I1 In many
10 Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise TraderApproach to Finance,
J. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 19, 19. The stock market crash of October 1987 has
been a focal point in the debate about the rationality of stock prices, with no
agreement that it is dispositive. Compare Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on BubblesJ.
ECON. PERSp., Spring 1990, at 13, 17 (stating that "[flor those not persuaded of the
existence of bubbles, the challenge is to provide persuasive interpretations of events
like the Great Depression, the stock market crash of October 1987, and other
apparent bubbles") with Eugene F. Fama, Perspectives on October 1987 or What Did We
Learn from the Crash?, in BLACK MONDAY AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 71,
77 (Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. et al. eds., 1989) (stating that "[i]f there are bubbles,
economic efficiency is served by letting them burst rather than leak"). In his more
recent work, Fama has emphasized the substantial difficulties of proving or disproving
the efficiency hypothesis. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Dividend Yields
and Expected Stock Returns, 22J. FIN. ECON. 3, 3-5 (1988); Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth
R. French, Permanent and Temporary Components of Stock Prices, 96J. POL ECON. 246,
247-48 (1988) [hereinafter Fama & French, Permanent and Temporay]; Eugene F.
Fama, Stock Returns, Expected Returns and Real Activity, 45 J. FIN. 1089, 1090 (1990).
11 This is not to say legal scholars and commentators have ignored the critiques
of efficiency theory or the development of noise. The most vigorous critic of
efficiency is Louis Lowenstein of Columbia University. See, e.g., LOuIS LOWENSTEIN,
WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET 52 (1988) (stating that "[t]he notion that in the
stock market you can 'trust prices,' as so many textbooks on corporate finance state,
has obviously dangerous implications"). Two excellent articles from the mid-1980s
are Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (focusing on and criticizing statistical
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ways our culture acts as if "economists proved the efficient market
hypothesis a decade ago and moved on to other topics entirely, so
that all that is left is for the law to come into conformity with this
intellectual orthodoxy." 12 Among other things, then, this is a
study in the intellectual history of securities regulation, of how and
why social-scientific theories become embedded in positive norms.
Part I traces the evolution of noise theory in the economics
literature, tying it to the broader debate over the economist's
conventional assumption of human rationality, demonstrating that
efficiency is legitimately debatable, and describing the parameters
of the debate.18 Notwithstanding its limited aim, this effort must
be a cautious one. Literature searches naturally lean toward the
interesting; those who select articles for publication in scholarly
journals prefer provocative hypotheses over confirmations of long-
held views. That the current economics literature is heavily
models of the efficiency theory) and William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock
Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1986) (describing anomalies
involving mispriced securities and suggesting that these reflect the market's
inefficiency); see also MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 47-55 (1987) (concluding that empirical studies have not validated
the efficient market hypothesis). A number of recent articles examine the efficiency
controversy with respect to securities litigation. See Ian Ayres, Back to Basics:
Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 997 (1991)
(analyzing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), and distinguishing between
informational and fundamental efficiency, two theoretically independent dimensions
of market efficiency); Jonathan R. Macey et al., Lessons from Financial Economics:
Materiality, Reliance and Extending the Reach ofBasic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017,
1049 (1991) (stating that it is "too complex [and unnecessary] to determine in a
securities fraud case whether the presumption of reliance on the integrity of the
market price isjustified on the basis of the existence of an efficient market"). Gilson
and Kraakman's article, though often cited as strongly endorsing an efficiency
perspective, recognizes the criticism of efficiency but takes the view that the
mechanisms of efficiency are worth studying in any event. See Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 1, at 551 (citing anomalies and studies that criticize efficiency).
Subsequently, Kraakman published a thoughtful article incorporating the insights of
noise theory in the context of the debate about takeover regulation. See Reinier H.
Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of !Discounted"Share Prices as
an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891 (1988). With some attention to this
literature, Lynn Stout claims that efficiency is overemphasized as a goal in securities
regulation. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613,696-706
(1988). Although these authors recognize the critiques of efficiency, they tend not
to tie these critiques to explanations of why markets might not behave efficiently.
12 Langevoort, supra note 3, at 539.
13 Noise theorists do not reject the presence of substantial efficiency properties
in the financial markets, nor do they deny that markets generally operate in an
uinbiased fashion. They simply claim that significant inefficiencies persist.
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populated by efficiency critics and noise theorists proves only their
prominence, not their correctness. Noise theory may itself turn out
to be a fad. Still, what is important for present purposes seems
beyond debate: strong claims of efficiency are debatable.
Part I also offers another contribution. The efficient market
hypothesis began as a statistical property, followed later by attempts
to explain through some coherent theory why this property holds.
Today, the literature provides many plausible explanations 14 that
are important in understanding the likelihood that various strategies
employed by securities regulation will be productive. Noise theory
offers a useful converse: an understanding of the possible mecha-
nisms of market inefficiency promises to be instructive in thinking
about the efficacy of regulatory strategies, especially their inherent
limitations in a world of cognitive imperfection.
Part II.A looks at the SEC's use of the efficient market hypothe-
sis in its deregulatory efforts to develop an integrated disclosure
system and to simplify the capital-raising process. It considers the
extent to which strong claims of market efficiency are indeed made
and reasons why at least the rhetoric of the efficient market might
have political value apart from substantive merit. Part II.B
duplicates this effort with respect to the principal judicial uses of
the efficiency hypothesis, namely, the fraud-on-the-market theory
and the more general question of measuring the extent to which
fraud affects a stock's price in a particular instance.
Part III synthesizes the effort-pointing out that uses of the
efficiency hypothesis are often more rhetorical than real-and offers
thoughts and reasons concerning what we know and what we simply
believe about the process of investing, and why.
Before this effort begins, one point must be made. The idea of
market efficiency is not necessarily tied to an assumption about
rationality. If stock price behavior is completely and mindlessly
arbitrary-a true random walk-statistical tests would demonstrate an
absence of arbitrage opportunities. Prices would be unbiased in the
sense that they would show no systematic tendency to be too high
or too low. Similarly, demonstrating that the market reacts
promptly to new information says nothing about the content of that
reaction. It might just be a fool's frenzy. Much of the efficient
markets literature, however, makes the stronger claim that financial
markets are built on rational expectations about asset values. The
14 These are cataloged in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1.
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explicit or implicit assumption is that information impounded
quickly in stock prices is nothing but information reasonably related
to expectations about future values. Used in this way, it is entirely
plausible to claim that prices reflect the most rational possible
assessment of present value.15
As we shall see, much of the recent revisionism in the finance
literature criticizes only the rationality of stock prices. Speed of
adjustment (at least with respect to certain types of information)
and the absence of profitable trading strategies remain useful
working assumptions. In assessing the role of efficiency theory in
securities regulation, then, it is important first to identify the type
efficiency claim being made in a particular setting. Does it assume
rational pricing, or just speed and lack of bias? Or neither?
I. THE ORIGINS OF NOISE THEORY: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
In many respects, the efficient market hypothesis is the natural
consequence of thinking about financial asset prices as an equilibri-
um in a competitive market consisting of rational actors. Indeed,
there is almost a tautological character to some forms of the
hypothesis once rationality is assumed.1 6 While none of its adher-
ents seriously deny the potential for irrational behavior by some
investors, classical theory trivializes the possibility.
To understand the evolution of noise theory it is necessary first
to visit a more fundamental controversy in economics: the
challenge to the assumption of pervasive rationality, whether in
organized markets or elsewhere. While this assumption might well
be "hard-wired" to the very thought process that makes economics
a discrete science,1 7 there is a palpable tension between it and the
body of knowledge generated by other behavioral sciences, most
notably psychology. This tension appears most vividly in research
15 The early work in the history of the efficiency hypothesis emphasized the
random walk element of stock prices. More recently, however, the rational
expectations model has come to dominate. See generally STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN,
RATIONAL ExPECTATIONS 141-46 (1983) (analyzing "volatility" tests that identify
market inefficiencies). In much of the legal literature distinctions along these lines
are generally made. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 11, at 344-49 (distinguishing between
information-arbitrage and fundamental-value efficiency). Too much emphasis on this
distinction, however, might be unwise. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1012-15 (1991).
16 See LeRoy, supra note 2, at 1593, 1613 (pointing out the "tautologous nature
of Fama's characterization of capital market efficiency").
17 See id. at 1615.
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relating to the process by which people make decisions under
conditions of uncertainty.
1 8
A. Rationality and Investor Behavior
The conventional economic model postulates that rational
decision-makers search for the option having the largest subjective
expected utility, determined by reference to probabilities derived
from the available information set. Although there are a variety of
formulations of this process, the widely accepted Bayesian principle
describes one in which new evidence results in continual revisions
of assessments, depending on a fairly rigorous appraisal of the
probative value of that evidence. Psychologists, however, have
developed an impressive body of research through laboratory tests
indicating that people (including well-educated ones) often act in a
decidedly non-Bayesian fashion. 19 Although the applicability of
this work to contexts outside the laboratory setting is somewhat
controversial,2 ° many of the particularly robust findings seem quite
18 This tension is widely discussed in the literature, and repetitive citations would
serve little purpose. The richest source of discussion is found in a 1985 conference
at the University of Chicago which drew many of the country's best-known economists
and behavioral scientists. See The Behavioral Foundations of Economaic Theory, 59J. BUS.
S181, S385-S468 (1986). The heading "Behavioral Economics" now appears as an
occasional indexing format in the American Economic Review.
19 For useful overviews of this research, with significant commentary on its
application to economics, see DECISION MAKING: DESCRIPTIVE, NORMATIVE, AND
PREsCRIpTwvE INTERACTIONS (David E. Bell et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter DECISION
MAKING]; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafterUDGMENT]; RICHARD NIsBETr & LEE Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980);
Ward Edwards & Detlofvon Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and TheirlImplicationsfor
the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1986); R.J. Herrnstein, Ritional Choice Theoy:
Necessay But Not Sufficient, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 356 (1990); Paul Slovic et al.,
Regulation of Risk: A Psychological Perspective, in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 241 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The
Psychology of Preferences, SCI. AM., Jan. 1982, at 160.
20 See Robin M. Hogarth, Beyond Discrete Biases: Functional and Dysfunctional
Aspects ofJudgmental Heuristics, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL. 197, 213 (1981) (concluding that
the decades of research on decision-making shows that "[j]udgment and choice
depend crucially upon the context in which they occur"); Arie W. Kruglanski, The
Psychology of Being Right": The Problem of Accuray in Social Perception and Cognition,
106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 395, 395-97 (1989) (providing a definition of accuracy in social
perception and cognition). The principal concern is that the laboratory experiments
are largely conducted out-of-context, depriving the subjects of daily experience,
learning, and feedback. For an argument that even "mindless" behavior may result
from adaption to rational incentives, see PaulJ. Heald &James E. Heald, Mindlessness
and Law, 77 VA. L. REv. 1127, 1141-64, 1168-70 (1991).
1992] SECURITIES REGULATION AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 859
relevant to the investment decision-making processes of individu-
als.
21
Widely discussed in the literature, for instance, is the tendency
of persons to make probabilistic decisions based on salient or easily
recalled information, rather than on base-rates and other more
complete data sets. 22 Therefore, recent or vivid information
receives a predictable overreaction from investors. Often choices
vary simply as a result of the framing of the question.23 When
coupled with another well-documented cognitive illusion-the
tendency to extrapolate from recently observed trends when the
sequence in fact lacks a conjunctive element 4 -this research
provides the basis for predicting that investors frequently become
trend-chasers.
A second phenomenon is the tendency of people to be overcon-
fident in their predictive abilities.25 In dealing with uncertain
events, they overweigh the skill element of their decisions, and
discount the element of chance.26 In hindsight, they substantially
overstate their ability to have foreseen future events and, thus, make
the correct decision. Investors may therefore systematically
underestimate the levels of risk they assume.
Then there is what researchers call the "endowment effect," or
a slight variant, the "status quo bias."27 This is the tendency to
21 For an early discussion of the application of behavioral research to the
investment context, see Paul Slovic, Psychological Study of Human Judgment:
Implications for Investment Decision-Making, 27 J. FIN. 779 (1972).
22 See, e.g., JUDGMENT, supra note 19, at 416 (asserting that "[t]he prevalent
tendency to underweigh or ignore distributional information is perhaps the major
error of intuitive prediction"). A common illustration of this sort of thinking is the
tendency to generalize that the incidence of criminality is higher than it really is in
the wake of a single, notorious crime. This tendency is referred to as the represent-
ativeness or availability heuristic.
25 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, in DECISION MAKING, supra note 19, at 167.
24 SeeJUDGMENT, supra note 19, at 7. The classic illustration is the gambler who
believes that he has a "hot hand" or that red is due on a roulette wheel after a long
run of black. This and the representativeness heuristic, of course, are interrelated.
Psychologists often invoke the notion of feedback to explain the tendency to repeat
behavior that has recently been (or appeared) successful.
25 See Edwards & Winterfeldt, supra note 19, at 238-40; Slovic et al., supra note 19,
at 247-48; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980).
26 See EllenJ. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
311, 327 (1975). In addition, there is a tendency to discount both future risks and
future payoffs in a distorted time frame. See Herrnstein, supra note 19, at 358-60.
27 The endowment effect seeks to explain why (well beyond the impact of
transaction costs) people are willing to buy an item at a certain price, but will sell the
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value that which is possessed more highly than that which is not: to
value out-of-pocket losses more than opportunity costs. A person
will place a particular value on an item prior to acquiring it and
then refuse to part with it except at a price substantially higher than
its original cost, one well beyond that explained by transaction costs.
This may explain the phenomenon of why investors sometimes hold
stocks longer than would otherwise be expected.28
The temptation to call these various predictable behaviors
irrational is not quite apt. They may simply reflect coping strategies
(heuristics) used in a stressful world with too much information and
too many choices. 29 More accurately, these behaviors are subopti-
mal. Whatever the locution, such decision-making is inconsistent
with the assumptions of the economists' model.
In describing the resulting intellectual tension, participants in
the debate sometimes refer to Thomas Kuhn's classic work on
scientific revolutions.30 The economists' model of rational interac-
same item only at a much higher price. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests
of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1328-29 (1990);
Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effec Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, J. EcoN. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193, 194-97 [hereinafter Kahneman et al.,
Endowment Effect]. A "status quo bias" is a preference for holding a particular item
over buying or selling that item. See Raymond S. Hartman et al., ConsumerRationality
and the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON. 141, 141-43 (1991); Kahneman et al., Endowment
Effect, supra, at 194, 197-99.
A related matter of potential interest in the area of securities regulation concerns
the evidence showing that persons in bargaining situations will often suffer substantial
losses rather than allow themselves to be treated in a manner they perceive as unfair.
See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59J. Bus.
S285, S286-88 (1986) (noting that subjects in experiments were willing to forego gains
in situations where they thought they were being treated unfairly).
28 See Hersh Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and
Ride Losers Too Long Theoty and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 778 (1985).
29 Many writers in this field borrow from Herbert Simon's notion that in the face
of uncertainty individuals do not search for the optimal solution, but instead do the
best they can given the costs associated with gathering and processing information.
See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 111
(1955). For a view that considers consumer response to "information overload"
under this "satisficing" model, see David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of
Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277,301
(1986). Moreover, there may be self-disciplinary effects associated with choosing not
to consider certain options, even valuable ones. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, Error and
Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive
Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 329,361 (1986) (noting that
people develop internal rules when exercising judgment in a satisficing situation).
For that reason, one should not approach suboptimal decisions in a necessarily
perjorative fashion.01 See THOMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
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tive behavior is a paradigm that for some time has given an
intellectual unity to the discipline. The behavioral literature, in
turn, has created at least the appearance of persistent anomalies
that must be dealt with by rejecting the anomaly as wrong, revising
the paradigm to accommodate the anomaly, or abandoning the
paradigm and moving to a new one (a paradigm shift). This is a
useful characterization, to which we shall return later. For now, it
suffices to say that the discipline of economics considers the
challenge of the behavioral literature a serious and important one,
although it is too early to determine which route toward resolution
will be taken.
Opinions diverge widely on this issue, further complicated by
the substantial methodological differences between the disci-
plines.8 1 The study of economics does not concentrate on process;
rather, models are used to generate predictions subject to testing.
The success of tle model depends on the correlation between the
prediction and the data, not the plausibility of the assumptions.
8 2
Thus, the behavioral criticism can be deflected to the extent that
outcomes continue to conform to the rationalist paradigm. In
contrast, the highly erratic and contextual incidence of cognitive
failures make it difficult, if not impossible, to construct an alterna-
tive model of human behavior that has the elegance and power of
that paradigm to generate hypotheses and predictions that can be
subjected to empirical testing. Not surprisingly, there has been no
paradigm shift within economics, and for a variety of reasons one
may never occur even if the anomalies persist.
3 3
1972). For references to Kuhn's work, see Allan W. Kleidon, Anomalies in Financial
Economics: Blueprint for Change?, 59J. Bus. S469, S469-70 (1986) (noting that Kuhn
argues that scientists are often willing to wait to respond to a discrepancy between
theory and fact); Richard Zeckhauser, Behavioral Versus Rational Economics: What You
See Is What You Conquer, 59J. Bus. S435, S435 (1986) (stating that Kuhn believes that
the struggle between competing scientific theories is "titanic" and can be resolved
only after a considerable amount of time is spent grappling with the theories).
1 See Robert M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder, Perspectives from Economics and
Psychology, 59J. Bus. S185, S194-99 (1986); Scott, supra note 29, at 333 & n.10.
2 This is the classic statement often associated with Milton Friedman. See MILTON
FRIEDMAN, The lethodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3,
23 (1953) ("[A] theory cannot be tested by the 'realism' of its 'assumptions'....);
see also MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS: OR How ECONOMISTS
EXPLAIN 104 (1980) (stating that Friedman's theory is that the realism of assumptions
is irrelevant and that a model is judged by its predictive power).
" The pressure to retain a usable paradigm is important, for without it, much of
the study of economic behavior would simply become a subset of the field of
psychology, which has itself been described as a loosely allied group of research
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B. Rationality in a Market Setting
Since the behavioral critique focuses largely on individual
cognitive capacities, it does not directly challenge the conventional
view that markets-especially highly organized financial markets34-
should operate to filter out these imperfections. 35  Still, the
critique raises questions regarding the presumed mechanisms of
market efficiency. For example, suboptimal behavior that is
common and predictable will not be of the random sort that
classical theory holds will cancel out.36 Explanations for why the
market operates efficiently are frequently based on the belief that
even "uninformed" decision-making by market participants is
improved by the consensus effect. Mistakes, biases, and excessive
optimism or pessimism are removed from the price-setting process
because the random, uninformed biases of individuals in the market
will cancel each other out, resulting in a market that on average
exhibits a capacity for greater predictive accuracy than the forecasts
of any individual trader.3 7 For this effect to operate with substan-
tial cleansing power, however, investors must operate in a largely
independent fashion with unsystematic biases. On the other hand,
if their errors take on a systematic or contagious character, this
analysis weakens.
Still, there are other checks that might operate protectively in
the financial markets. In contrast to other contexts, such as simple
consumer transactions, financial markets involve high stakes and
place a premium on expertise through repetition. Moreover, stock
communities. See Hogarth & Reder, supra note 31, at S188. Any understanding of
the sociology of professional life would suggest that such an event is unlikely. See
infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
34 It has been noted that the financial markets are the least likely to be
contaminated by suboptimal cognitive traits. This observation places a great deal of
stress on the notion of market efficiency, because if suboptimal behavior is found in
the financial market to any significant degree, it will be more pervasive in most other
exchange settings. See Hogarth & Reder, supra note 31, at S199-S200.
35 See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 682
(1979) ("[W]hen markets are competitive, individuals are protected from the adverse
consequences of making decisions in the face of imperfect information.").
36 See, e.g., Shleifer & Summers, supra note 10, at 23 (stating that irrational
demand shifts occur and "seem to be a response to changes in expectations or
sentiment that are not fully justified by information").
37 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 581-88 (drawing heavily from Robert
E. Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and Market Information
Efficiency, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 874 (1980), and Robert E. Verrecchia, On The Theoly of
Market Information Efficiency, 1 J. ACCT. & ECON. 77 (1979)).
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trading provides learning opportunities that might overcome the
cognitive illusions to which laboratory subjects are susceptible.
38
And there is always the economist's trump card: assuming there is
plenty of smart money in the market, any irrational tendencies
causing prices to move away from fundamental values will immedi-
ately be exploited and eliminated through arbitrage.
These points are well taken and might have served largely to
immunize the efficient market hypothesis from behavioral revision-
ism but for two sorts of observations. First, there is the anecdotal
evidence of apparent market fads and fashions, and the disturbing
fact that a fair portion of those associated with the securities
industry themselves seem, publicly at least, not to believe in market
efficiency and its implications. In particular, the volume of trading
on the financial markets seems well in excess of what the efficient
market hypothesis would predict.8 9 Second, as we have seen,
working strictly within the confines of the rationalist paradigm, a
substantial body of statistical data was generated during the 1970s
and 1980s that appeared flatly to contradict the hypothesis. 40  A
38 For an example of an experimental study that supports the view that markets
do provide a useful corrective mechanism for many cognitive biases, except, to some
degree, the "exact representativeness" heuristic, see Colin F. Camerer, Do.Biases in
Probabilityfudgment Matter in Markets? Experimental Evidence, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 981,
994-96 (1987). For a commentary skeptical of the behavioral literature's application
to corporate or securities law, see Roberta Romano, A Comment on Information
Overload, Cognitive Illusions, and Their Implications for Public Policy, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
313, 324-27 (1986). As Professor Romano suggests, the behavioral literature may
support the view that repeated learning opportunities and expertise make cognitive
illusions less likely to affect actual decisions. See id. at 316-17. But feedback is
effective only when errors are unambiguous and quickly communicated. See HillelJ.
Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of
Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395 (1978). This is not necessarily the case for
investments in common stocks. In fact, where feedback is not swift and plain, even
experts show a susceptibility to highly fallible probabilisticjudgments. See Colin F.
Camerer, Comment On Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychologyfor Risk
Regulation," 19J. LEGAL STUD. 791, 794 (1990).
Romano also suggests that the investment decision is somewhat simpler than
many consumer transactions, since under the assumptions of modern portfolio
theory, the investor is simply seeking the proper mix of risk and return. See Romano,
supra, at 325. This last point assumes a model of investor decision-making that the
behavioralists suggest may not be descriptively accurate.
" See LeRoy, supra note 2, at 1615.
40 For a comprehensive survey of the studies through 1989, see LeRoy, supra note
2, at 1595-1603. LeRoy asserts that Fama's 1970 paper on market efficiency, see
Fama, supra note 7, "marked a high point for capital market efficiency; most of the
evidence accumulated in the nearly 20 years since then has been contradictory rather
than supportive." LeRoy, supra note 2, at 1595. For other overviews of the literature,
see EDWIN J. ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND
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number of studies demonstrated the excessive volatility of share
prices relative to asset values (such as expectations about divi-
dends).41  Studies of price behavior isolated persistently anoma-
lous patterns, such as seasonal and small firm variations.
42
Recently, a great deal of attention has been directed toward the
tendency of upswings in prices to be followed by declines, and vice
versa.43 While these works remain controversial," they bolstered
INVESTMENT ANALYsIs 399-433 (4th ed. 1991), and Donald B. Keim, Stock Market
Regularities: A Synthesis of the Evidence and Explanations, in STOCK MARKET ANOMALIEs
16, 16-35 (Elroy Dimson ed., 1988). A particularly influential contribution to this
contradictory body of evidence was Richard Roll's claim that only 35% of the monthly
return volatility in a typical stock's price was explainable bK reference to the
traditional expost categories of information. See Richard Roll, R,43J. FIN. 541, 565
(1988).
The publication of these statistical studies, along with the growing criticism of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model as a measure of asset value, led some legal
commentators in the mid-1980s to caution against the use of the efficient market
hypothesis. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 764-65; Wang, supra note
11, at 401-02. By and large, these efforts pre-date the noise theorists.
' See, e.g., David N. Dejong & Charles H. Whiteman, The Temporal Stability of
Dividends and Stock Prices: Evidence from the Likelihood Function, 81 AM. ECON. REV.
600,615 (1991) (concluding that dividends are probably trend-stationary and thus do
not adequately describe stock prices); Kenneth D. West, Bubbles, Fads and Stock Price
Volatility Tests: A Partial Evaluation, 43J. FIN. 639, 639 (1988) (concluding tentatively
that "stock prices are more volatile than can be explained by a standard constant-
expected-return model").
42 One of the earliest identified anomalies was different price behavior during a
particular month of the year (January) and during times when markets were closed
compared to when they were open. Price behavior studies are discussed in LeRoy,
supra note 2, at 1609-10. Another anomaly, long recognized in the literature, is the
pricing of closed-end investment companies, whose price often diverges from its easily
determined intrinsic value. See Charles M.C. Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the
Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46J. FIN. 75, 76 (1991) (asserting that the closed-end fund
anomaly is a result of the changing sentiment of investors).
" This is known as reverting to mean. See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: A Mean-Reverting Walk Down Wall Street, J. EcON. PERSP.,
Winter 1989, at 189, 191-98 (reviewing evidence supporting the contention that stock
prices are mean-reverting); James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, Mean
Reversion in Stock Prices: Evidence and Implications, 22 J. FIN. ECON. 27, 53 (1988)
(concluding that a historical analysis of stock prices supports a reverting-to-mean
theory); cf Marc Bremer & Richard J. Sweeny, The Reversal of Large Stock-Price
Decreases, 46 J. FIN. 747, 754 (1991) (concluding that large one day decreases in a
stock's price are followed by positive rebounds, albeit not as great as expected); Bruce
N. Lehmann, Fads, Martingales, and Market Efficiency, 105 Q.J. ECoN. 1, 25-26 (1990)
(rejecting efficient market hypothesis and concluding that stock portfolios with
positive returns one week had negative returns the next week, and vice versa).
44 Some of the earlier studies were criticized for their methodology, such as the
presence of small sample biases, etc. See, e.g., Allan W. Kleidon, Bias in Small Sample
Tests of Stock Price Rationality, 59J. Bus. 237, 239 (1986) (suggesting the existence of
small sample biases); Terry A. Marsh & Robert C. Merton, Dividend Variability and
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the intuition among their proponents that for one reason or
another, factors other than fundamentals were affecting stock
prices. The behavioral literature offered an appealing explanation.
45
Variance Bounds Tests for the Rationality of Stock Market Prices, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 483,
484-85 (1986) (questioning the variance bound methodology used to support rejection
of the efficient market hypothesis).
Even if the presence of statistical anomalies is conceded, there remains the
possibility that the efficient market hypothesis can be modified to accommodate them
without disrupting its essential character. See, e.g., RonaldJ. Balvers et al., Predicting
Stock Returns in an Efficient Market, 45 J. FIN. 1109, 1109-10 (1990) ("[W]ithin an
efficient market framework, stock prices need not follow a random walk.. . ."); Fama
& French, Permanent and Temporary, supra note 10, at 247 (asserting that "the
predictability of long-horizon returns can ... result from time-varying equilibrium
expected returns generated by rational pricing in an efficient market").
A continuing debate in the literature involves the testability of the predictions
generated by the efficiency hypothesis. For a variety of reasons, many of the
statistical tests may lick the power to confirm or falsify the hypothesis. See, e.g., N.
Gregory Mankiw etal., Stock Market Forecastability and Volatility: A StatisticalAppraisal,
58 REv. ECON. STUD. 455,472-73 (1991) (noting that volatility and regression tests fail
to confirm, but not strongly, the efficient market hypothesis); Robert P. Flood &
RobertJ. Hodrick, On Testingfor Speculative Bubbles,J. ECON. PESP., Spring 1990, at
85, 94-98 (discussing the problems of different asset price volatility tests designed to
test for bubbles in the market); see also Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. & R.W. Hafer, Do
Fundamentals, Bubbles or Neither Determine Stock Prices? Some International Evidence, in
THE STOCK MARKET: BUBBLES, VOLATILrTY, AND CHAOS 31, 62 (Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr.
& R.W. Hafter eds., 1990) (noting that "neither a rational bubble nor'the'fundamen
tal model adequately characterizes the behavior of stock prices in several countries").
For a more general perspective on testability, see Michael R. Gibbons, The
Interrelations of Finance and Economics: Empirical Perspectives, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 35
(1987) (discussing some empirical interrelations of finance and economics in
explaining securities pricing).
45 One economist has suggested that the behavioral literature was actually the
motivation for some of the statistical studies. See Werner F.M. De Bondt, What Do
Economists Know About the Stock Market?, 17J. PORTFOLiO MGMT., Winter 1991, at 84,
84. Pressure on the efficient market hypothesis comes not just from the statistical
studies and the behavioral literature. A substantial body of work is developing that
takes issue with some of the discrete assumptions that underlie it. For instance, one
assumption is that the markets are perfectly competitive so that individual traders do
not affect prices. Some commentators feel that an assumption of perfectly
competitive markets is not valid. See, e.g.,Jean-Jacques Laffont & Eric S. Maskin, The
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, 98J. POL. ECON. 70,
87 (1990) (asserting that if traders are big enough to affect prices, as they appear to
be, strategic behavior will diminish the informational efficiency of the markets).
Similarly, while classical theory posits the existence of a perfectly elastic demand
curve, some commentators contend otherwise. See Laurie Simon Bagwell, Shareholder
Heterogeneity: Evidence and Implications, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 218, 221 (1991)
(concluding that supply curves for corporate equity are not perfectly elastic); Andrei
Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN. 579, 588-89 (1986)
(concluding that the demand curve for corporate securities slopes downward). For
the legal implications of this point, compare Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums
Really Premiums? Market Price Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1295-
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C. Noise
The idea that the stock markets are influenced by psychological
factors has a long history, going back at least to Keynes. 46 Keynes
hypothesized that investors were playing a game akin to the
newspaper beauty contests of the time, where readers voted for the
most attractive contestant and the winners of the pool came from
those who voted for the entrant who received the most votes.
Under those circumstances the strategy was not to vote for the one
the voter considered most attractive (fundamental analysis), but
simply to try to guess for whom the other voters would vote. This
skeptical view of the financial markets has persisted in the popular
literature and has retained some notable adherents even within the
economics profession.47 But this was very much a minority view
in the profession until the price studies persisted in producing
anomalous results. The effort then began in earnest to theorize
about suboptimal investor behavior and noise trading.
48
96 (1990) (positing that the demand curve is downward sloping and concluding that
if this is the case, "legal rules premised on the accuracy of efficient market prices...
may be fundamentally unsound") with J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E. Woodward,
Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm's Publicly Traded
Stock, 25 GA. L. REV. 783, 816-18 (1991) (taking issue with Professor Stout's
conclusions). In addition, there are some questions regarding whether institutional
money managers always act as faithful agents-that is, whether they maximize
portfolio value in making trading decisions. For example, they may be trend chasers
because of a desire to look in step with their competitors and may not be concerned
with maximizing portfolio value. One phenomenon that has been noted is "window
dressing": selling certain stocks at the end of a fiscal period to make the portfolio
composition look good on a certain measurement date. SeeJosef Lakonishok et al.,
Window Dressing By Pension Fund Managers, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 227, 231 (1991).46 See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INTEREST
AND MONEY 155 (1935). On Keynes's influence on modern noise theory, see Robert
Piron, Correspondence: Keynes as Noise TraderJ. EcON. PERSP., Spring 1991, at 215.
47 One adherent is Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow. See KennethJ. Arrow,
Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 1 (1982); see alsoJames
Tobin, On the Efficiency of the Financial System, LLOYDs BANK REV., July 1984, at 1, 5
(stating the author's skepticism concerning fundamental-valuation efficiency).
48 Some of the first efforts in this direction were by De Bondt and Thaler, whose
work emphasized the representativeness heuristic as a basis for observed trend
chasing. See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793, 804 (1985) [hereinafter De Bondt & Thaler, Overreact?]
(concluding that investors' overreaction to unexpected news affects stock prices);
Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction
and Stock Market Seasonality, 42J. FIN. 557 (1987) (providing further support for the
overreaction hypothesis). Their studies have been reexamined in later studies.
Compare Allen B. Atkins & Edward A. Dyl, Price Reversals, Bid-Ask Spreads, and Market
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The most visible of the noise theorists has been Robert Shiller
of Yale, one of the researchers who first sought to demonstrate
excessive price volatility.4 9 His view begins with the claim that the
inherent unpredictability of dividends and earnings for most
industrial companies means that even smart money behavior is
largely guesswork and intuition-an art, not a science, and thus
unlikely to be a reliable predictor of value even in a consensus
setting. 0 Moreover, people invest not simply to make money but
also for investing's consumption or "play" value, exhibiting the
biases (including the addictive ones) of gamblers generally.51
These traits apply not only to the average individual investor, but to
professionals as well. In the wake of the 1987 market crash, for
Efficienzy, 25J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 535 (1990) (concurringwith De Bondt
and Thaler's investoroverreaction hypothesis for explaining why stocks with the worst
returns outperform stocks with the best returns during the period of return and
subsequent periods) with Paul Zarowin, Size, Seasonality, and Stock Market Overreaction,
25 J. FIN. & QUANTrrATIVE ANALYSIS 113, 124 (1990) (concluding that "losers'
superior performance over winners ... is due, not to investor overreaction, but to
size discrepancies").
49 Robert Shiller has written extensively on this topic. In 1989, his then-existing
work was compiled in a single volume. See ROBERTJ. SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY
(1989) [hereinafter SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY]. For examples of his subsequent
work, see RobertJ. Shiller, Market Volatility and Investor Behavior, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
58 (1990) [hereinafter Shiller, Investor Behavior], and Robert J. Shiller, Speculative
Prices and Popular Models, J. ECON. PEPSP., Spring 1990, at 55 [hereinafter Shiller,
Speculative Prices].
So This point is made extensively in many of the critiques of the efficiency
hypothesis. At the risk of some overstatement, it makes little more sense to talk
about smart money in terms of predicting future earnings than it does to talk about
smart money in the Illinois lottery. They are guesses, and often not very good ones.
See J.G. Cragg & Burton G. Malkiel, The Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of
the Growth of Corporate Earnings, 23J. FIN. 67 (1968). While the market may cause the
price to reflect the more moderate of these views, where actions are wholly
independent, the potential for herd behavior and other common traits to dominate
is significant. For additional criticism of the idea of smart money in the market, see
DAVID DREMAN, THE NEW CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGY 95-115 (1979) (drawing
heavily on the behavioral literature).
51 See SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY, supra note 49, at 57-60. On the relationship
between gambling behavior and investment behavior, see Richard H. Thaler &
William T. Ziemba, Anomalies: Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and LotteriesJ.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1988, at 161, 170-72. The idea that investment may serve other
goals is also supported, somewhat more informally, by a study suggesting that wealthy
people often choose their investment advisers largely for the status they confer, with
profitability being a secondary consideration. See Andrew E. Serwer, The Wacky Way
the Wealthy Invest-And How to Do It Right, FORTUNE, July 1, 1991, at 21 (report of a
study by CSSP Technologies, a market research firm); see also ROBERT H. FRANK,
CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985)
(providing broader support for the idea that status can often be more important in
decision-making than direct pecuniary benefits).
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example, Shiler and a colleague conducted a survey to demonstrate
that the reasons for the high volume of trading by market partici-
pants during the price break (including institutional investors) were
based on non-fundamental hunches, emotions, and intuitions.
52
In Shiller's view, most investors do not have the capacity or
inclination to make comparative investment decisions independent-
ly, making them susceptible to external expressions of expert and
peer opinion (ever-shifting "popular models"). To provide support,
he draws not only from the behavioral work described above but
also from social psychology, sociology, and epidemiology. One of
his fundamental claims is that investors (again, including profession-
als) are linked in constant communication networks and are heavily
influenced by others in making trading decisions. As a result, there
is a group dynamic to the decision-making process, providing a
setting in which rumors and fads can be disseminated widely and
rapidly.53 As with the flu, we may know that the disease of irratio-
nal investor behavior will periodically become an epidemic, but we
are unable to predict where or when-something that limits
arbitrage possibilities and increases noise trader risk. Here there is
a strong echo of the well-known financier Bernard Baruch's
comment that "I never see a brilliant economic thesis expounding,
as though they were geometrical theorems, the mathematics of price
movements, that I do not recall [Gunther] Schiller's dictum:
'Anyone taken as an individual, is tolerably sensible and reason-
able-as a member of a crowd, he at once becomes a blockhead.'"
54
Ultimately, Shiller believes that stock prices have a substantial fad
component, coupled with the tendency to revert to mean.
52 See SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY, supra note 49, at 379-400; see also Paul Slovic,
Analyzing the Expert Judge: A Descriptive Study of a Stockbroker's Decision Processes, 53J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 225 (1969) (providing a much earlier study of stockbroker behavior
along these same lines).
See SHILLER, MARKET VOLATILITY, supra note 49, at 61-62; RobertJ. Shiller &
John Pound, Survey Evidence on Diffusion of Interest and Information AmongInvestors, 12
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 47 (1989); see also Paul B. Andreassen, On the Social
Psychology of the Stock Market: Aggregate Attributional Effects and the Regressiveness of
Prediction, 53J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 490 (1987) (arguing that financial news
influences individuals to make less regressive predictions). For a work that draws on
the literature of sociology to reach consistent conclusions, see Michael Klausner,
Sociological Theory and the Behavior of Financial Markets, in 2 THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF
FINANCIAL MARKETS 57 (Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler eds., 1984).
54 Bernard M. Baruch, Foreword to CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR
DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS at xiii, xiii (L.G. Page & Co., 2d ed. 1932)
(1841).
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Other economists have also sought to test for suboptimal
investor tendencies. They have produced evidence, for instance,
that investment analysts55 and economic forecasters56 overreact
to certain information just as the laboratory model predicts. Data
collected by French and Poterba show that investor portfolios are
nowhere as diversified in terms of international investments as
would be optimal, a result they suggest may be related at least in
part to a variety of cognitive illusions rather than to institutional
constraints. 57 Familiar concepts like "herd migration behavior,"
"barn door closing," and "Monday morning quarterbacking" have
been observed, 58 along with the presence of psychological barriers
in daily trading activity (for example, otherwise inexplicable
resistance levels at round numbers on the Dow Jones average).59
55 See Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact?,
80 AM. ECON. REv. 52 (1990).
56 See De Bondt & Thaler, Overreact?, supra note 48, at 793 & n.7.
57 See Kenneth R. French & James M. Poterba, Investor Diversification and
International Equity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 222 (1991).
58 See Jayendu Patel et al., The Rationality Struggle: Illustrations from Financial
Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 232 (1991). The idea of barn door dosing raises an
extremely interesting point, amply supported by a variety of behavioral studies:
people will hold stocks they buy for too long. See, e.g., Shefrin & Statman, supra note
28 (examining why individuals have a tendency to "sell winners too early and ride
losers too long"). One can support this conclusion from a variety of'perspectives, like
the endowment effect, see supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text, and the theory
of cognitive dissonance, pursuant to which people having made a commitment to a
choice (the purchase decision) filter out information inconsistent with that decision,
see Klausner, supra note 53, at 71-75. The literature has not yet addressed in any
systematic fashion the moral-hazard problem in this sort of social dynamic. It is in
the interest of brokerage firms and the securities industry to feed whatever cognitive
or emotional sentiments that might support investors' decisions to purchase stocks,
and to create ambiguity that may lessen the negative feedback generated by apparent
mistakes. The securities business may in part frame investment choices in ways
designed to make salient the positive features, to create impressions of successful
trends, and to place enough time pressure on customers to impress upon them that
the bandwagon is leaving with only one or two seats left. See, e.g., Brett Trueman, A
Theory of Noise Trading in Securities Markets, 43J. FIN. 83, 93 (1988) (concluding that
one reason for investment managers to trade on noise is their tendency to promote
their funds by creating the illusion of active stock picking via excessive turnover).
The natural question is how such illusions-natural or synthetic-can persist in the face
of repeated suboptimal choices by investors. One possible answer is that feedback
is ambiguous: apart from a bankruptcy situation, the investor whose stock has
decreased in value knows (and can be reassured) that the bet is still on the table and
that the good times are yet to come. Ambiguity can delay and interfere with the
learning process, resulting in persistent suboptimal behavior. See Einhorn & Hogarth,
supra note 38, at 409. Furthermore, after a loss is sustained one can rationalize many
explanations as the product of forces other than bad decision-making or bad advice.
59 See R. Glen Donaldson, Psychological Barriers in Asset Prices, Rationality and
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None of these studies, however, offers any explanation to
overcome the conventional objection that suboptimal behavior
cannot persist for very long because of the arbitrage opportunities
it creates. To date, the most formal effort to explain how noise can
be sustained is found in a series of articles by four well respected
economists at Harvard and the University of Chicago-Andrei
Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, J. Bradford De Long, and Robert
J. Waldmann. 60 They work with a model that assumes that inves-
tor sentiment (non-fundamental considerations such as responding
to pseudo-signals by market gurus, the use of inflexible trading
strategies, etc.) affects the demand for risky assets. In support of
this assumption, they draw explicitly from the behavioral literature,
especially the idea of feedback trading: the tendency to extrapolate
from past data and thereby chase a trend.
They argue that arbitrage is limited and therefore incomplete
because of the presence of two types of risk.6 1 One risk is that the
arbitrageur's assessment of the true state of affairs will simply turn
out to be wrong. The other risk comes from the unpredictability of
noisy trading. Knowing that stocks are out of line now does not
mean they will be less out of line tomorrow. Indeed, if feedback
trading is a sufficiently predictable phenomenon, the correct smart
money strategy may well be to jump on the bandwagon, so long as
it can be done early enough and the position liquidated in time. If
the Efficient Market Hypothesis 2-4 (May 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author).
60 For an overview, see Shleifer & Summers, supra note 10. For the specific
articles, see J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J.
POL. EcON. 703 (1990); J. Bradford De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment
Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379 (1990) [hereinafter De
Long et al., Positive Feedback];J. Bradford De Long et al., The Size and Incidence of he
Losses from Noise Trading, 44 J. FIN. 681 (1989); J. Bradford De Long et al., The
Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64J. Bus. 1 (1991); see also David M.
Cutler et al., Speculative Dynamics and the Role of Feedback Traders, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
63 (1990); Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986).
61 See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 10, at 20-21. This, in turn, assumes the
presence of significant transaction costs to the arbitrage process. See also Andrei
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 148 (1990) (suggesting that because of transaction costs, among other
things, arbitrage activity is skewed in favor of short-term assets (such as options and
futures), with the result that the market for long-term assets (such as stocks) is less
efficient than the market for short-term assets).
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Whether their particular noise trading hypothesis (or any other)
will survive efforts to falsify it empirically is by no means clear. But
that is beside the point; what is significant is that it is being put
forward seriously as an explanation of stock price behavior that is
preferable to the efficient market hypothesis, given the available
data. The prominence of this type of work demonstrates that
economists' understanding of securities prices is still evolving and
may take any number of diverse directions over the coming decade.
A substantial agenda for future research includes a sizeable
cognitive psychology component. By no means is the efficient
market theory dead; it has exhibited considerable resilience, and
there are many economists who strongly believe that with time it
can and will be refined in a way that does away with the anoma-
lies.63 To be sure, there has been no refutation of the original
insight that animated the efficient market hypothesis through the
identification of trading strategies that have produced consistently
positive abnormal returns.
6 4
For now, one can generalize only by saying that current research
accepts that there is some noise in stock prices. How much, how
often, and for how long prices might move out of line with funda-
mental values is a matter of considerable uncertainty. In his
frequently cited article, Fischer Black suggests that the markets
might well show a level of efficiency in which price is typically
"within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half of
value and less than twice value."65 This view, he suggests, places
him somewhere "in between" the classical adherents of the efficient
fundamental analysis but in trying simply to predict what others will do, and do it
first. In fact, there may be some sense in making visible "irrational" purchases to
trigger an overreaction. See De Long et al., Positive Feedback, supra note 60, at 380.
s See e.g., Robert C. Merton, On the Current State of the Stock Market Rationality,
in MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRANco MODIGLIANI 93
(Rudiger Dornbusch et al. eds., 1987).
64 See Simon M. Keane, Paradox in the Current Crisis in Efficient Market Theory, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1991, at 30. Some of those who suggest that overreaction
is a typical investment phenomenon have indicated that contrarian investing-taking
positions against the trend-should be profitable. See DREMAN, supra note 50. But see
K. C. Chan, On the Contrarian Investment Strategy, 61 J. Bus. 147, 163 (1988) (finding
that "the contrarian strategy earns a very small abnormal return, which is probably
economically insignificant"). That is also the implication of the tendency of prices to
revert to mean. Of course, clear identification of such a strategy as profitable would
no doubt signal the immediate death of its prospective viability.
65 Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986). With this definition of
efficiency, Black suggests that the market is probably efficient 90% of the time. See
id.
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market hypothesis and researchers like Robert Shiller.66 Similarly,
the latest edition of Burton Malkiel's well-known book A Random
Walk Down Wall Street expresses the view that fads and fashions can
and do influence stock prices, although efficiency prevails most of
the time.
67
An objective observer walking away from this debate would be
something of an agnostic. While some efficiency properties
characterize the securities markets, we simply do not yet know for
sure much more than that. This alone should give us pause, for if
the sources noted earlier are to be believed, the efficient market
theory has become something of an article of doctrinal faith in
corporate and securities law. If so, its routine and confident
incantations are an embarrassing contrast to the open-mindedness
within the economics profession.
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF NOISE: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
USES OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
The economics literature leaves us with competing visions of the
world of securities trading. On one hand, there is the conventional
view of the efficient market, coldly impounding all significant
information into prices that consistently reflect expectations about
fundamental asset value. Noise is too trivial to merit scholarly or
regulatory attention. On the other hand, there is a vision of stock
prices influenced by a crowd of trend chasers, overreacting to the
most recent or most vivid news, their illusions and emotions fed by
a securities industry loading one bandwagon after another. Smart
money cannot operate as an immediate counterweight. It is
underfinanced and too subject to risk and the temptation to join in
the game of trying to out-guess others. All we really know is that
reality lies at some unknown point between these visions.
68
66 See id. at 533 n.1 1. For a view even closer to Shiller's, see LeRoy, supra note
2, at 1616 (stating that "[t]he evidence suggests that, contrary to the assertion of this
version of efficient markets theory, such large discrepancies between price and
fundamental value regularly occur").67 See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 210-11 (5th ed.
1990).
68 This is not to say that these two visions are a complete description of the
predictable influences on stock prices. Work has been done, for example, on the
demand for stocks as a result of changing levels of savings capital produced by
demographic patterns. See Zhi-Wu Chen, Population Aging and Expected Market
Risk Premiums (1989) (unpublished manuscript), cited in Shiller, Investor Behavior,
supra note 49, at 61. In addition, much investing today in the securities markets is
"information-less." The most common example is the index fund that places new
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Yet we are told that modern securities regulation has accepted
the efficient market hypothesis as its vision,69 at least for markets
involving widely traded stocks. 7° That belief leads to a natural
series of questions, best posed in the following way. First, if the
stock markets are indeed very noisy, does this mean that the various
administrative and judicial uses of the efficient market hypothesis
are misdirected? Second, assuming that the argument for noisiness
is not appreciably stronger or weaker in the economics literature
than that for efficiency, how should prevailing policy deal with the
ambiguity?
A preliminary step, however, is to inquire into the soundness of
the assumption that securities regulation uses the efficient market
hypothesis in a strong way. If it does not, the debate about noise
will be far less troublesome, readily left to the academic journals.
Maybe its use is superfluous, or disingenuous. These are the
questions to which we move first.
A. The SEC and the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Although the efficient market hypothesis has a fairly long
history, its prominence in legal circles began with some fairly
venomous attacks on the need for mandatory disclosure in the
securities marketplace by a number of economists in the 1960s.
Most notable were the works of George Benston and George
money in a broad range of representative stocks, without engaging in any analysis
whatsoever. To the extent the stock market is efficient, index investing makes a good
deal of sense and will have no price impact one way or the other. If not, index
investing will have an unpredictable impact that at the very least will not contribute
to efficiency. For a critique, see LOWENSTEIN, supra note 11, at 64-66. Some studies
of market efficiency have considered the price impact of adding a stock to a widely
followed index (something that has no impact on its fundamental value), thereby
finding evidence of inefficiency. See, e.g., Lawrence Harris & Eitan Gurel, Price and
Volume Effects Associated With Changes in the S&P 500: New Evidence for the Existence
of Price Pressures, 41 J. FIN. 815 (1986).
69 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 550; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note
11, at 762-63; Marvin G. Pickholz & Edward B. Horahan III, The SEC's Version of the
Efficient Market Theory and its Impact on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 943, 943 (1982); Stout, supra note 45, at 1237, 1296.
70 Largely because that is where the data is available, almost all the sophisticated
statistical studies of price movements deal with exchange-traded securities. By
hypothesis, the over-the-counter markets are presumed to be less efficient because of
the lower levels of liquidity and professional investor/analyst interest. In fact, market
efficiency should be thought of as a continuum rather than a yes-no question: at one
end of the spectrum is the General Motors and IBM stocks, at the other end is penny
stocks. Efficiency varies as a matter of degree from one end to the other.
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Stigler, 71 later championed in legal circles by Henry Manne.
72
These studies purported to show that the mandatory disclosure
regime created by Congress in 1933 and 1934 had no apparent
beneficial effect on investment decision-making and instead simply
layered unnecessary costs on the capital formation process. Implicit
was the view that the same private forces that make the market
efficient would also produce optimal disclosure. As the agency that
has overseen the disclosure system since its inception, the SEC bore
the brunt of this intellectual attack.
Predictably, the Commission did not respond formally through
much of the 1970s. 73 The process of coming to grips with the
teachings of the economics literature began with the Advisory
Committee Report on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC, 74 a study
done for the SEC designed to revisit some of the fundamental policy
assumptions on which securities regulation is based.75 Professor
William Beaver served on the committee and authored a chapter of
the report on the efficient market hypothesis, concluding-as is the
prevailing view today-that even if one accepts the hypothesis as
conventionally formulated, it does not necessarily follow that there
is no social benefit to mandatory disclosure.
76
71 See GeorgeJ. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,63 AM. ECoN. REV. 132 (1973); GeorgeJ. Stigler,
Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37J. Bus. 117 (1964).
72 See Henry G. Manne, Economic Aspects of Required Disclosure under Federal
Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 21 (College of Business and Public Administration, New
York University ed., 1974).
73 The work of Stigler and Benston has been criticized within the academic
community, however. See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The SEC Through
a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382 (1964) (criticizing Stigler's theory, statistics, and the
inference he draws from his data, as well as his test of previous regulations and his
discussion of market efficiency); Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Required
Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 467, 467 (1975)
(questioning Benston's conclusion that "empirical analysis provides no support for the
belief that the disclosure and related provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 were either needed or desirable").
74 See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH
CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO
THE SEC (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
75 See id. at 1.
76 See id. at 636, 647. The question is whether private forces would more
efficiently obtain the appropriate level of information from issuers (in short, would
issuers have appropriate incentives to disclose even absent regulation?). Views on this
vary, as well as on the question of whether free-riding, duplication, and overlap
problems would stand in the way of an optimal allocation of investigatory resources.
For a sampling of the debate, see John C. Coffee,Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
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The Advisory Committee Report made a number of reform
recommendations, the most important of which was to pursue the
integration of the content of mandatory disclosure for the two types
of markets, primary, which was the subject of the Securities Act of
1933,77 and secondary, the subject of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934.78 This was based on the view that investors need the
same sort of issuer-specific information regardless of whether they
buy from the issuer or from other investors on the stock exchang-
es.79  Another recommendation was to create three tiers of
companies, which would assume different forms of disclosure
obligations when they made public distributions of securities
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933. Seasoned companies would
have abbreviated disclosure obligations, based on the assumption
that, because those companies were already subject to the continu-
ous disclosure obligations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in
order to inform trading decisions in the secondary markets, a new
formal disclosure document in the form of a registration statement
or prospectus that contained the same information would be redun-
dant.80 By the end of the decade, the SEC-heavily influenced by
the Carter administration's deregulation philosophy-was prepared
,to implement that recommendation as part of what soon became
known as the integration project.
Case for a Mandatoy Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REV. 669 (1984); Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets:
Implications of Modem Finance Theoy and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979);Joel Seligman, The Historical Need
for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
77 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a.-77bbbb. (1988)).
78 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a.-78/l. (1988)).
79 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 422 (stating that the SEC
recognized that the disclosure principles under the 1934 Act applied to listed
securities and securities traded in over-the-counter markets).
80 See id. at 433-34 (recognizing that for seasoned companies, "a statutory
prospectus containing disclosure other than that relating to the terms of the
transaction is not necessary" because those companies "usually provide high-quality
corporate communications documents" and are "widely followed by debt and equity
analysts").
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1. Integrated Disclosure
In 1982, the Commission adopted the three-tier system of
Securities Act disclosure that the Advisory Committee had recom-
mended. The SEC's adoption authorized the use of the highly
abbreviated Form S-3 for equity offerings by companies with a float
of outstanding securities held by the public greater than $150
million (or $100 million and an annual trading volume of three
million shares)-a rough proxy for widely followed companies.
8 1
Form S-3 is significant because it is the primary example of
regulatory reform cited for the proposition that the SEC accepts the
teachings of the efficient market hypothesis. The Commission
stated so explicitly: the adopting release indicates that Form S-3
was created "in reliance on the efficient market theory."8 2 In the
proposing release, there was a more elaborate statement that it is
the "Commission's belief that the market operates efficiently for [S-
3] companies, i.e., that the disclosure in Exchange Act reports and
other communications by the registrant, such as press releases, has
already been disseminated and accounted for by the market-
place."
8 3
Such was the rhetoric. But on close inspection, it is clear that
the adoption of Form S-3 rests very weakly-if at all-on the efficient
market hypothesis. The Commission's definition of efficiency says
nothing about equilibrium identity or the assumption that the
market correctly values individual stocks. Instead, Form S-3's
adoption rests on the relatively mild assertions, not questioned by
most noise theorists, that market price reaction, at least to definite
news (for example, a dividend increase or a takeover), is indeed
quite rapid,8 4 and-even less controversially-that market partici-
pants draw on a variety of sources other than Securities Act
81 See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13(b)(1) (1991). Whether it is a good proxy is another
question, for many people have noted that the number of companies extensively
followed by analysts is less than that covered by the form. See, e.g., Gordon &
Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 813. This is a good illustration of the difficulties
inherent in treating efficiency as a yes/no type of question. For a fine study of the
history of the integration project-including its use of the efficient market hypothesis-
by one of the principal staff persons involved in it, see Edward F. Greene, Determining
the Responsibilities of Underwriters Distributing Securities Within an Integrated Disclosure
System, 56 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 755, 783 & n.185 (1981).
82 See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 33-
6383, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,382 (1982).
83 Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of Securities
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-6331, 46 Fed. Reg. 41,902, 41,904 (1981).
84 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 60, at 596; Ayres, supra note 11, at 968-73.
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disclosures for information. In any event, the largely unnecessary
character of reliance on the efficient market hypothesis can be
demonstrated by unbundling mandatory disclosures subject to Form
S-3 into three parts: information production, certification, and
dissemination. This is territory well covered some years ago by
Professors Gordon and Kornhauser, but bears elaboration.
8 5
By and large, mandatory disclosure does not stress the produc-
tion of information, assuming that most material information has
been gathered and is in the possession of the issuer's senior
management at the time of a public distribution. Still, the format-
ting required by the disclosure forms no doubt creates some new
information, and occasionally the due diligence search effectively
imposed by the Securities Act leads to some information discov-
ery.8 6 This, however, is completely unaffected by the adoption of
Form S-3, since the effect of that form is simply to incorporate by
reference the same disclosures required under the periodic
disclosure obligations, updated to reflect any material changes. The
disclosure content does not change simply because a company
qualifies to use the abbreviated form to raise new capital.
Certification is the process by which the required disclosure is
made credible by the issuer's management and those assisting
management in the disclosure and distribution process-under-
writers, attorneys, and accountants. To be sure, certification is an
important part of an informed stock price, given the incentives of
issuers and their associates to cheat, and the difficulties presented
to investors in otherwise distinguishing desirable investment vehicles
from lemons. 87  Nc(thing in the hypothesis as conventionally
understood, moreover, denies that an efficient market can be
defrauded-that the mechanisms of efficiency can process lies along
with the truth.8 8 The Securities Act accomplishes the certification
85 See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 786-96.
86 For instance, the lawyers' search to assure that prior board actions (the issuance
of stock or the validity of contracts, for example) were valid may turn up information
regarding problems and risks, which are then either cured or disclosed.
7 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 602-07. This certification comes about
not simply by the due diligence investigation leading to better disclosure, but by the
underwriter's willingness to associate its reputation with the price being offered. See
James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising Underwriting and the
Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 264-71 (1986).
88 See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 816 & n.144. The so-called strong
form of the efficient market hypothesis states that price reflects all information about
a stock (public and private), but there is no significant empirical support for such a
view. See id. at 771 & n.19; FAMA, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 7, at 166.
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objective largely through a strict civil liability scheme, whereby the
participants assume a considerable financial risk if there are
material misstatements or omissions in the registration state-
ment.89 As a formal matter, when Form S-3 is used, nothing
changes with respect to liability or mandatory disclosure. While the
form itself is an abbreviated one, the process of incorporation by
reference to prior Exchange Act filings means that the same liability
risk attaches to the incorporated material as to the short-form
disclosures.
In reality, however, it is open to question whether the quality of
certification is as extensive under this integrated disclosure system
as when a complete due diligence investigation is done immediately
prior to the distribution. Although the Commission indicated that
it expected Exchange Act filings that might later be incorporated by
reference to be prepared with greater care (perhaps with some
continuous outside counsel and/or investment banker involve-
ment°), some skepticism is in order.91 In fact, if done at the
same level of diligence as a registration statement, such a step would
actually increase the costs that the integration project promised to
reduce.
92
89 Pursuant to section 11 of the Securities Act, the issuer is strictly liable for
material misstatements and omissions, unless they are not the cause of any
subsequent price decline. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11, 48 Stat.
74 (1933) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988)). In addition, certain members
of senior management, directors, underwriters, and other experts are liable jointly
and severally unless they show that they reasonably believed, after due investigation,
that there was no such falsity or omission. See id.
go See, e.g., Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg.
52,889, 52,890 (1983) (stating that the adoption of due diligence procedures to the
integrated disclosure system "serve[s] to address the concerns about the adequacy of
disclosure and .... thus, ensure the protection of investors").
91 See, e.g.,JOSEPH AUERBACH & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, INVESTMENT BANKING AND
DILIGENCE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION? 108-22 (1986); Merritt B. Fox, Shelf
Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis,
70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1025-28 (1984); Lynn Nicholas, The Integrated Disclosure System
and Its Impact Upon Underwriters' Due Diligence: Will Investors Be Protected?, 11 SEC.
REG. L.J. 3, 18-20 (1983). Some indication that integration may reduce the
responsibilities of underwriters is Rule 176, which states that whether the information
was incorporated by reference determines the extent of the duty to investigate. See
Rule 176, 17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (1991). When a public offering involving incorporation
by reference is plainly contemplated, there is little doubt that the filings will be
prepared in an environment similar to the traditional due diligence setting. If not,
however, the likelihood that issuers will invite a retrospective revisiting of their filing
is somewhat lessened.
92 It is possible that the SEC's strategy was not really to produce cost-savings at
all, but rather to create an environment wherein issuers would be forced to expend
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Since the SEC refused to concede that there would be any
significant reduction in the quality of disclosures as a result of
incorporation by reference, there was no need for it to invoke the
efficient market hypothesis to support such* a step. Indeed, since
the Commission also allowed incorporation by reference for S-2
issuers-smaller registrants,93 about whom no efficiency claim was
made-it is clear that the hypothesis is not part of its logic with
respect to the verification component of mandatory disclosure.
94
We are left, then, with dissemination. Here, Form S-3 does
make a difference in that company-specific disclosures so produced
and certified must be made to the SEC (where they become publicly
available), but need not be delivered to investors as the securities
are being marketed. If the efficient market hypothesis holds, this
is obviously correct: the information is already correctly impounded
in price and disclosure adds no value. But what if stock prices are
quite noisy, sucli that we cannot trust the stock price to be in line
with fundamental expectations at the time of the distribution?
greater resources in assuring the accuracy of their Exchange Act filings, given the
importance of those filings to investors. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11,
at 815-16. If that is the case, then costs associated with any loss of protection at the
time of distribution might be outweighed by the gains to others in the secondary
markets.
93 In general, a Form S-2 issuer is one that has been subject to the continuous
disclosure system of the Securities Exchange Act for three years, current in its filings,
and not in default. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.12 (1991).
9 Suppose the SEC is mistaken, however, and that integration does result in less
diligence going into the preparation of qualifying registration statements. Putting
aside the overbreadth that comes from its coverage of Form S-2 issuers, could the
efficiency hypothesis nonethelessjustify this manner of deregulation? Common sense
suggests that the larger, more visible, and more closely scrutinized a company is, the
less likely it is to fool the investment community in a significant way. If so, there is
roughly an inverse relationship between the measure of efficiency and the incidence
of successful fraud. See Shleifer, supra note 45, at 585-88. It then follows that the
value added by regulation-induced certification decreases relative to its costs for
efficiently traded companies. Such incorporation by reference is cost-justified even
if there is less due diligence by the lawyers, underwriters, and accountants at the time
of an S-3 offering. Whatever the plausibility of this reasoning (a strong counter-
argument might be that whether or not the incidence of fraud for efficiently traded
stocks is lower, the aggregate impact when fraud occurs is likely to be larger), it need
not rest on a strong claim about the efficiency of stock prices. In large part, any
perceived inverse relationship couldjust as easily be premised on the simple presence
of persons or institutions monitoring the issuer either to deter or expose the fraud,
without making further assumptions about how quickly or accurately assessments of
credibility are impounded in price. In the end, however, this certification analysis is
academic. Once again, the SEC made no use of it in justifying integrated disclosure.
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No doubt much of the political appeal of integrated disclosure
comes from a number of nonefficiency-based theories of securities
regulation that converge to support its attempt to create cost
savings for issuers and, hence, lower the cost of capital. Homer
Kripke, for example, long advocated a two-tier regulatory structure
wherein mandatory disclosure obligations were oriented toward the
professional investor-the sm-art money, expert enough to use it-
rather than the typically indifferent layperson.95 The latter are
protected indirectly, since most are presumed to rely on profession-
als for advice and information. Under this approach, eliminating
dissemination obligations under Form S-3 is cost-justified simply
because, as an empirical matter, the predicted rate of primary
information usage by average investors is so low.96 Those who
advocate a "gatekeeper"-oriented strategy will likewise find the
SEC's initiative appealing.97 Here, the primary investor protection
mechanism is not information delivery but the interpositioning of
professionals with strong pecuniary and reputation interests at stake
(underwriters, accountants, and lawyers) who can be expected to
deter opportunistic issuers from seeking capital.9  While the
95 See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DIsCLOsURE: REGULATION IN
SEARCH OF A PURPosE 96-116 (1979). The principal virtue of this approach is that it
frees the SEC from the need to insist on simplicity in required disclosures, enabling
greater use of sophisticated, forward-looking data.
96 There is widespread availability of these documents for investors who want
them, especially in a high-tech disclosure environment. See Donald C. Langevoort,
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747,
786 (1985). Also take note that section 5 of the Securities Act does not necessarily
require the delivery of disclosure documents to investors before they make their
investment decision. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 5, 48 Stat. 74
(1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77e. (1988)). In a situation (other than
an initial public offering) where sales are done over the telephone, the first time the
investor sees the disclosure document is often when the sale comes in the mail. Even
mild behavioral insight suggests that the likelihood that a dense disclosure document
will be read, after the customer has agreed to the purchase, is quite small.
97 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2J. L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 53, 54 (1986). Gatekeeper strategy depends
on the assumption that certain market participants control access to markets. If so,
making them responsible for harm by those seeking entry (fraud by issuers, for
example) is an efficient strategy, especially since such participants have a pre-existing
reputational interest in not being tainted anyway and can thus be trusted to do some
level of monitoring. An underwriter, for example, can withhold its services from an
issuer that does not assist in the certification process, or it can price the securities in
a way that includes the equivalent of an insurance premium, see Seha M. Tinic,
Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 797-800 (1988)
(discussing the use of underpricing as a form of insurance).
98 At the issuer level, the simple introduction of outside underwriters, accoun-
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ability of underwriters to perform due diligence in an integrated
disclosure environment may be diminished, those professionals still
face the same stakes and have the capacity to bar issuers from access
to the markets, or, through pricing, to compensate for the risk.
Indeed, even a blatant cynic about investor behavior is likely to
find Form S-3 appealing. There is no reason to expect that
widespread delivery of dense information packages is likely to
counter suboptimal tendencies to any significant degree-especially
those indicated by a feedback trading model, in which other
investors' behavior, rather than issuer-generated information itself,
is the primary motivation for trading.99 This brings us to an
important irony. Just as efficiency-based reasoning sometimes
teaches that regulation is unnecessary, reasoning based on the
sources of inefficiency sometimes teaches that exactly the same form
of regulation is .unhelpful or irrelevant. In either case it is not
worth the costs. Though dramatically different in assumptions, both
methods of reasoning lead to precisely the same skepticism about
conventional forms of regulation. In the end, therefore, the ability
to justify deregulation in such a variety of ways lessens the fear that
investors will be harmed if markets are not strongly efficient. It also
weakens the alleged causal relationship between the efficiency
hypothesis and Form S-3.
2. Rule 415
The other portion of the SEC's integration effort that refers
explicitly to the efficient market hypothesis is Rule 415,100 the
shelf registration rule. This rule allows issuers eligible to use Form
S-3 to register offerings on a delayed basis (that is, to have securities
eligible for sale, waiting for some future point to begin the
distribution).1 0 1 The regulatory intent was to provide issuers with
greater flexibility in timing their offerings, looking for windows of
tants, and elite law firms into the capital raising process operates as a deterrent to
issuer "lemons" from even seeking capital; alternatively, those who want access to the
public markets will have to appear to conduct themselves in a way acceptable to the
professionals. In this sense, there is a behavioral impact quite apart from the
substance of the subsequent disclosure. A different gate to the marketplace can be
found at the investor level, where the goal is to assure that brokers and others
recommending securities do so in an informed and unbiased fashion. See jAMES D.
COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 1187-88 (1991).
99 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
100 See Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1991).
'0' See Rule 415(a)(1)(x), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(1)(x) (1991).
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opportunity in market conditions, and then proceeding quickly with
the distribution.
10 2
Much of Rule 415 is not controversial; it is simply a codification
of long-standing practice. To the extent that it facilitates the raising
of investment-grade debt capital there is little concern, since such
sales are based largely on yields arid external ratings by Moody's and
Standard & Poor's. The controversy surrounding Rule 415 has to
do with its expected practical impact on equity financing, particular-
ly with respect to the certification of information.103 As noted
earlier, there is a controversy over whether due diligence will
diminish as a result of incorporation by reference, even when there
is a conventional distribution so that underwriters at least have the
opportunity to investigate. 10 4 By contrast, Rule 415 invites issuers
to file a registration statement well in advance of the distribution-
indeed, before the underwriters are even selected. 10 5 The innova-
tive portion of the rule is valuable in situations when the issuer can
both finalize and commence the plan of distribution within the
perceived fleeting window of opportunity. There is no meaningful
opportunity for due diligence at that time. 10 6 In adopting the
102 For an overview regarding the history and mechanics of Rule 415, seeJohn P.
Ketels, SEC Rule 415-The New Experimental Procedures for Shelf Registration, 10 SEC.
REG. L.J. 318, 318-32 (1983). The two-step process makes it relatively easy for the
issuer to impose a competitive bidding regime on underwriters at the. time the
distribution is to be effected.
103 This controversy is amply reflected in the debate between Fox, supra note 91,
and Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatoty Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:An
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 145-84 (1984); see also AUERBACH & HAYES,
supra note 91, at 189-90 (arguing that Rule 415 should focus on distinctions among
corporate issuers rather than the distinction between debt and equity financing). In
the initial proposals, the ability to raise equity capital under Rule 415 was not limited
to S-3 issuers. Much of the controversy surrounded the impact of the rule with
respect to smaller companies, a concern eliminated by the rule as finally adopted.
104 See supra note 91.
105 See Rule 415(a)(4)(iv), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(iv) (1991).
106 As with integrated disclosure, the SEC suggested that the loss of due diligence
will be minimal. In one sense, this is more plausible in the shelf registration setting,
since by filing such a registration statement, the issuer is statinga bona fide intent to
distribute the securities within a two-year period. See Rule 415(a)(2), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.415(a)(2) (1991). Greater care (and prospective underwriter involvement) in
the preparation of the periodic disclosure documents is unlikely to be wasted. At the
same time, however, there remains some doubt about whether due diligence at the
time the disclosure package is being prepared can ever be effective without the
presence of a gatekeeper/bargaining agent facing both reputational and liability
exposure in the forthcoming deal. The Commission's suggestions included (1)
naming underwriters in advance; (2) naming counsel in advance for underwriters to
be named later; or (3) periodic meetings with potential underwriters. See Shelf
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final version of the rule, which limited its availability to S-3 issuers,
the SEC again, albeit somewhat abstrusely, invoked the efficient
market theory.
10 7
This appears to be a stronger efficiency claim than in the
integrated disclosure setting. A noisy view of the securities
markets-especially one characterized by high levels of feedback
trading-suggests that there will be times when the prevailing price
is excessively high as a result of investor overreaction to positive
signals. That is the ideal market window, and without some
assumption about efficiency, Rule 415 would simply be inviting the
issuer with a shelf registration to take advantage of it.
By all accounts, Rule 415 is designed to create a more competi-
tive capital raising environment for large issuers who might
otherwise be tempted to move off-shore for their funds; subsequent
studies have documented cost savings.108 The question, then, is
whether the loss occurring in due diligence is compensated by the
lower cost of capital. This in turn depends (in part) on the extent
to which other mechanisms serve as efficient substitutes for due
diligence in performing a certifying function. In an efficient market
this netting out would occur naturally as the average amount of loss
in the certification value compared with the gains from the
floatation cost savings. Equity shelf registrations would occur only
when a positive value is anticipated.
Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889, 52,892-93
(1983).
• Concern has been raised from the issuer's perspective regarding the desirability
of following these Commission suggestions. There is concern regarding the first step,
since much of the gain in Rule 415 comes from the ability to place potential
underwriters in competition with each other at the time of the actual distribution.
The conflict of interest problem inherent in the second also raises concerns because
the issuer selects and compensates the attorneys. Similarly, free-rider and related
incentive problems are associated with the third suggestion. See Fox, supra note 91,
at 1005-09, 1025-34.
107 See Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889,
52,892 (1983) (according to the efficient market hypothesis, "at the time S-3/F-3
registrants determine to make an offering of securities, a large amount of information
already has been disseminated to and digested by the marketplace").
108 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Rule 415 Experiment: Equity Markets, 40J. FIN.
1385, 1389-1400 (1985) (concluding that empirical analysis suggests lower issuing
costs under Rule 415); David S. Kidwell et al., SEC Rule 415: The Ultimate Competitive
Bid, 19J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 183, 186-95 (1984) (same). But see David
S. Allen et al., The Shelf Registration of Debt and Self Selection Bias, 45J. FIN. 275, 277-
86 (1990) (concluding that "those firms having chosen to use shelf registration had
lower issuing costs during period before shelf registrations were possible").
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Using this reasoning, researchers have sought to explain the
interesting phenomenon that, notwithstanding the documented cost-
savings, equity shelf registrations rarely occur.10 9 Indeed, their
use has actually decreased since the period immediately following the
rule's adoption." 0  One explanation is that the loss of certifica-
tion value perceived by the market-evidenced by the abnormally
greater drop in market price of the issuer's securities upon an
announcement of a shelf offering than upon the announcement of
a traditional distribution-is for most issuers not worth the sav-
ings.
11 '
Suppose we assume noisiness instead. 112 On its face, there is
the potential for the abuse observed above. This potential, however,
is subject to two constraints as well. One constraint is found in
questioning the frequency at which managers are likely to identify
market windows successfully; they will do so rarely if they suffer
from cognitive limitations comparable to the investment community.
Indeed, managerial overoptimism, or hubris, may be greater than
that characterizing investor behavior.
113
The other constraint is found in the role played by the invest-
ment banker. For implementing the new issues of equity into an
existing trading market pursuant to a shelf registration, the SEC
requires the use of one or more underwriters;" 4 in most other
instances, except for so-called "bought deals," their use is still a
109 See DavidJ. Denis, Shelf Registration and the Marketfor Seasoned Equity Offerings,
64J. Bus. 189, 191-95 (1991).
10 See id. at 190.
11 See id. at 197-98. The predictable market drop upon the announcement of a
bid is rationalized under the so-called certification hypothesis (see infra note 116) by
assuming that investors take the intent to make an offering as an indication that
management believes that the issuer's stock is overpriced. Underwriters then play a
certifying role in bonding the credibility of management's assessment of price. The
abnormally large drop would reflect the market's assessment of the certification loss
in a shelf offering.
112 In fact, with respect to common stock offerings, the notion of a window of
opportunity seems at odds with the efficient market hypothesis, a curious inconsisten-
cy in the SEC's position. Gordon and Kornhauser point to numerous ways in which
Rule 415 does not seem entirely consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. See Gordon
& Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 819 n.154.
1s Cf. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197,
212-14 (1986) (discussing managerial hubris as a possible explanation of the takeover
phenomenon of mergers and tender offers).
114 See Rule 415(a)(4)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(iii) (1991). An at-the-market
offering is a distribution of stock into an existing trading market. The Commission
further limits the percentage of new stock sold pursuant to Rule 415 to 10%. See
Rule 415(a)(4)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.415(a)(4)(ii) (1991).
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practical necessity.115 The underwriter is put in a difficult posi-
tion, as a result of the lack of opportunity for due diligence, unless
one of the precautionary steps has already been taken. The
underwriter retains, however, substantial residual power to refuse
to act and may thereby deny the issuer access to domestic markets
if it senses for some reason that due diligence would serve as the
optimal protective device, but is not practically available. After all,
the underwriter's reputation is at stake and it faces the threat of
liability. The underwriter will thus choose whether to assume the
risk, and at what price.1 1 6 The gatekeepers' reputational interests
and simple risk aversion should caution against repeated involve-
ment in sales immediately before a predictable reversion to mean.
The evidence described earlier regarding the limited use of shelf
registration for equity offerings may simply reflect this bargaining
dynamic, without the need for any strong claims about pricing
efficiency.
11 7
More generally, echoing a point made earlier, we must ask
whether there is anything in Rule 415 itse/f that is likely to exacer-
115 Bought deals are sold directly to institutional investors, who presumably can
bargain directly for whatever certification or other protection is desired. See Gordon
& Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 822.
116 There is much literature documenting the tendency of underwriters to
underprice public offerings (at least in the near term), with many competing
explanations. One explanation is the certification hypothesis (stating that underpric-
ing is an effort to protect reputation); another explanation is the insurance hypothesis
(stating that underpricing reduces liability exposure). This evidence suggests that the
bargaining dynamics do operate as a check on issuer overreaching, even in the Rule
415 environment. For a view that the premium charged by underwriters to reflect the
risk is not worth the protection. see David M. Green, Comment, Due Diligence Under
Rule 415: Is the Insurance Worth the Premium?, 38 EMORY LJ. 793 (1989).
117 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. For evidence that abnormally
high premiums in shelf registrations cause some issuers to prefer traditional
distribution methods, see David W. Blackwell et al., ShelfRegistration and the Reduced
Due Diligence Argument: Implications of the Underwriter Certification and the Implicit
Insurance Hypotheses, 25 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYsIs 245, 250-58 (1990).
Gordon and Kornhauser identify a separate problem with Rule 415: it gives the
market insufficient time to digest information released on the eve of the offering
(e.g., last minute 8-K filings, the dilution effect of the particular distribution), with the
SEC apparently assuming that market price reaction is all but instantaneous. See
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 11, at 819. They suggest that this assumption is
far too strong given the available evidence and that the Commission should have
considered a two-day cooling off period. See id. at 823. This is a valid concern,
especially in a noisy environment. It is possible, however, that underwriters will
readily acquiesce in an offering immediately upon the release of fundamental
information in an Exchange Act disclosure or become involved in a distribution that
is based on rushing to market immediately before there is an opportunity to
appreciate some adverse information.
886 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:851
bate the overreactive tendencies of investors. Even the certified
accuracy of firm-specific information that attends a traditional fixed-
price offering is unlikely to dampen the enthusiasm of investors
caught up in a market-wide speculative bubble or a contagion of
hopefulness regarding a given stock or industry.118 If so, the case
for trying to at least capture the cost savings associated with
flexibility is that much stronger. In the end, then, we are left with
ambiguity in assessing whether there is any strong efficiency claim
implicit in Rule 415.
3. Why Efficiency?
If neither integration nor Rule 415 need rely on the efficient
market hypothesis for their legitimacy, a natural question is to ask
why the SEC chose so clearly to make the efficiency claims. In any
event, did the Commission not appreciate the tentative, evolutionary
nature of the economics literature that suggested that dispositive
claims about efficiency might be premature?
There are many plausible answers. First, of course, is that the
SEC was not making any strong claims at all-that it was using the
efficient market hypothesis as a shorthand for the almost self-
evident description of the market as a voracious consumer of
information. If so, the problem is only in the way the Commission's
signal has subsequently been interpreted. Second, it is possible that
the Commission, like many others, simply did not appreciate the
tentative nature of the empirical support for the efficient hypothe-
sis. The genesis of the integration project is roughly contemporane-
ous with Jensen's notorious quotation that the hypothesis is one of
the best supported in all of economics; 119 most of the mainstream
criticism came after its completion in 1983. This would point to the
118 For a view that equity offerings (especially initial ones) tend to coincide with
upswings in general market sentiment, see EdwinJ. Elton et al., New Public Offerings,
Information, and Investor Rationality: The Case of Publicly Offered Commodity Funds, 62
J. BUS. 1, 2-3, 13-15 (1989); Lee et al., supra note 42, at 105-08; see also SHILLER,
MARKET VoLATILrrY, supra note 49, at 61-62 (discussing studies of group-induced
polarization of attitudes). The open question here regards the consistency between
this and the certification hypothesis. One possible resolution is that periods of
positive investor sentiment last long enough for offerings to generate the sort of
short-term positive feedback that is consistent with their investment in reputational
capital, with any downswings coming too late, and in too ambiguous an environment,
to operate harmfully.
119 See supra text accompanying note 8. Many academic writings of the time
supported the view that the accuracy of the hypothesis was firmly established in the
economics literature. See supra note 9.
1992] SECURITIES REGULATION AND MARKET EFFICIENCY 887
dangers inherent in the importation of social science research to
more normative settings by those who are poorly equipped to
understand it. Another fairly benign explanation is that the SEC
staff was acting in its usual lawyer-like way, engaging in the art of
advocacy by introducing all possible grounds to support its decision,
necessary or not.
120
There is, however, still another insight to consider, one that may
play a substantially underappreciated role in the intellectual history
of the efficient market theory as a positive norm. The efficiency
hypothesis is laden with political content. Its implications are very
strong for nonintervention or deregulation in a host of corporate
and securities law settings, hostile takeovers (the cause celebre of
the 1980s) in particular.121 If accurate, its invocation is plainly in
the public interest. If overstated or wrong, the resulting deregula-
tion still produces, a shift of wealth from one group to another.
Organized interests that foresee favorable results will treat strong
statements of the research (and those who produce it) as a valuable
commodity.
This brings us to two more possible administrative uses of the
hypothesis. One is pretext. Rule -415 was expected to have a
substantial impact in a number of ways: one was diminished
certification, and the question of whether investors would be net
losers as a result; another had to do with the economic gains and
losses as between issuers and investment bankers generally, or
(equally probable) allocations of wealth within the investment
banking industry.122  Without necessarily endorsing a darker
120 Since the integration policy was first put forward by the Advisory Committee
on Corporate Disclosure in a report that was heavily influenced by an efficient market
perspective, it should not be surprising that the subsequent policy-formulation
process would relate back rhetorically to that document. Invoking the rhetoric of a
report with such perceived legitimacy could well facilitate the negotiation process
involved in bringing the policy initiative to fruition. For thoughts on the role of
ideology and rhetoric in SEC policy formulation, see Langevoort, supra note 3, at 539.
121 See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 928-29.
122 The specific concern was that larger investment bankers would gain at the
expense of regional ones, for a variety of reasons. One reason is that traditional
syndications, on which the regionals are heavily dependent, would decline in favor of
shelf offerings, which cannot easily be accommodated to syndication. To the same
end, there was concern that issuers forced to name underwriters in advance in the
registration statement would naturally choose the largest and most reputable
underwriters. This was an important part of the reasoning of one former Commis-
sioner, Barbara Thomas, who dissented from Rule 415. See generally Banoff, supra
note 103, at 169-76 (discussing former Commissioner Thomas's concerns about the
'capital markets and the effect of Rule 415 on regional underwriters).
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explanation for Rule 415, a cynic-or a public choice theorist-could
readily see the use of the efficient market hypothesis simply as a way
of offering an illusion of legitimacy to rent-seeking behavior.1
23
The related possibility is that, quite apart from the particular
merits or politics of integration and Rule 415, the SEC intended to
do what the audience has since perceived: to send a signal of
support for this form of economic reasoning to a variety of groups
outside the agency. The theory that agencies "play" to external
audiences through signalling is implicit in the literature dealing with
the behavior of public organizations. 12 4  Invoking the efficiency
hypothesis could be expected to resonate in a variety of circles,
especially the SEC's most significant constituencies-the Congress
and the executive branch of the early 1980s. During this period, the
use of economic theory as an organizing principle for deregulation
in a variety of market settings (for example, airlines and cable
television) was a highly visible part of public policy, uniting
otherwise diverse political groups. Publicly endorsing that ideology
could only enhance the SEC's standing among its regulatory peers.
Political capital can be acquired with the appropriate rhetoric, quite
apart from whether (and perhaps even because) it is substantively
overstated.
125
123 On the use of illusions in rent-seeking legislation, see Jonathan R. Macey,
PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986). Carefully chosen rhetoric may also serve as a
mechanism to preserve administrative discretion and to shield particular decisions
from careful scrutiny. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interes and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J. L. EcON. &
ORGANIZATION 167, 180-81 (1990).
124 For a view that bureaucratic behavior is characterized as a signalling dialectic
whereby the outputs of the agency are driven by the approval feedback received, see
Roger G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinay Survey and Synthesis,
in REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9,41-52 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
Rhetorical signalling is a direct way of bonding with tlose audiences.
125 For interesting commentaries on the role of economic ideology-both
substantively and rhetorically-in the politics of deregulation, see MARTHA DERTHICK
& PAULJ. QUIRK, THE POLITICS OF DEREGULATION 246 (1985) (noting that economic
advice "tends to be efficacious insofar as it has two general attributes, which are by
no means necessarily related: substantive soundness.., and political adaptiveness-
the ability of analysis to meet further criteria inherent in the political process and to
underlie rhetoric that meets those criteria"); see also James Q. Wilson, The Politics of
Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 386-87 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980)
(emphasizing the economics background of many individuals who became influential
policy-makers in the late 1970s and early 1980s); Levine & Forrence, supra note 123,
at 186 (discussing the importance of signals for engendering extensive political
support).
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The cumulative mix of all of these possible explanations is an
imponderable; all were probably factors in the development of the
integrated disclosure system and Rule 415. Since the early 1980s,
the SEC has not relied explicitly on the efficient market hypothesis
in any affirmative rule-making activity, and indeed has taken a
number of steps that have been criticized as inconsistent with such
a belief.126 There is no way of knowing, of course, the extent to
which the hypothesis has become part of the internal bureaucratic
culture of the Commission, or the extent to which it has been
invoked to justify inaction as opposed to formal deregulation. The
signal of the early 1980s, however, lives on.
B. Judicial Uses of the Efficient Market Hypothesis
Separately from the SEC's invocation of the efficiency hypothe-
sis, the courts have also incorporated economic theory into their
way of thinking about securities litigation. The two principal uses
the courts find for economic theory are its role as an intellectual
linchpin for the fraud-on-the-market theory, and, more generally, its
role as a device for assessing the impact of misinformation on stock
prices.
1. The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory
In litigation under the principal antifraud provision of the
federal securities laws, Rule 10b-5, courts have long insisted that
plaintiffs satisfy some sort of reliance requirement. 127  This
insistence on a showing that the misrepresentation or nondisclosure
distorted the investor's active . deliberative processes derives,
126 Perhaps the best illustration is the hostile takeover. SEC policy during the
1980s was in many ways consistent with the free market ideology supported by the
efficient market hypothesis. The Commission at the same time, however, took steps
regarding the equal treatment of security holders which would be unnecessary if one
truly believed in the ability of shareholders to sell out into the market at any time at
a fair price. See, e.g., Short Tendering Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 20,799,16 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 628 (Apr. 6, 1984) (barring hedged and multiple tendering of
securities in a tender offer). The Release also included an insightful efficiency-
oriented dissent by Commissioner Cox. See id. at 631-32. For a suggestion that
Commission policy is hardly likely to be internally coherent at any given time, see
Langevoort, supra note 3, at 535-38. For a view of the efficiency claim implicit in the
Commission's one-share/one-vote policy, see infra note 222 and accompanying text.
127 See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.) (discussing
the importance of a reliance requirement in civil cases under Rule 10b-5), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
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somewhat awkwardly, from Rule 10b-5's common law anteced-
ents.
128
The fraud-on-the-market theory accords plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5
class actions a rebuttable presumption of reliance if they bought or
sold their securities in an "efficient" market. They need not show
that they actually knew of the communication that contained the
misrepresentation or omission. The conventional fraud-on-the-
market theory was first recognized by the Ninth Circuit in 1975 in
Blackie v. Barrack.129 In Blackie, the court determir'ed that the
presumption of reliance was reasonable because misinformation has
the power to affect the stock prices at which the investor trades, and
thus cause injury even in the absence of direct reliance.1 30 The
presumption can be rebutted only by showing that the plaintiff
knew the truth or would have traded anyway had the truth been
known.131 Over the next decade, the Blackie theory was followed
by a number of appellate courts, and rejected by none.1 2 The
128 See Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-63 (3d Cir. 1986). The awkwardness,
which has often been noted, derives largely from the development of common law
fraud in the context of face-to-face bargaining, and not from settings (like the
organized markets) where information dissemination is diffused and complicated.
19 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). For a look at
some of the factual complexities in the reliance aspect of Blackie, see COX ET AL.,
supra note 98, at 1091-95.
'30 See Blackie, 524 F.2d at 905-08.
131 See id. at 906.
1.52 See, e.g., Peil, 806 F.2d 1154; Lipton v. Documation Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985). The trend was perceptively
analyzed in Barbara Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of Dispensing with Reliance
Requirements in Certain Open Market Transactions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1984), and in
Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1982). There are a
number of variants on the theory. For example, in Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982), the Second Circuit allowed an investor
who was not aware of the actual misstatement to proceed based on the allegation that
the information she did use to decide to purchase the stock in question, a newspaper
article on the company's product development, would have been different had its
author been aware of the truth. This is a true "secondary reliance" claim. See id. at
367.
In addition, a number of courts have allowed class actions on the part of
investors in tax-exempt public offerings to proceed without a showing of actual
reliance by claiming that if the truth had been known, the securities in question
would not have been marketable because investment bankers and other "gatekeepers"
would have avoided involvement with the securities. See, e.g., Shores v. Sklar, 647
F.2d 462,469 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane) (stating that plaintiff's main burden of proof
in a 10b-5 action is simply to prove that "defendants knowingly conspired to bring
securities onto the market which were not entitled to be marketed"), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1102 (1983). More recently, these courts have refined the theory to require a
showing that the securities were truly worthless, and not just less valuable than
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fraud-on-the-market theory is often understood to carry with it the
second presumption that in an efficient market, a material misrepre-
sentation or actionable omission influences the market price, and
therefore removes the need to actually prove the impact.
183
Though theoretical in construct,18 4 the fraud-on-the-market
theory is intensely practical in application. The reliance stories of
individual investors vary substantially; if each investor/class member
had the burden of establishing reliance, the resulting litigation
would be too difficult and costly to justify.1 35 Indeed, the class
advertised-a step that has substantially undermined the usefulness of this fraud-on-
the-market theory. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank South N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 730 (11th Cir.
1989) (en banc) (concluding that appellants failed to establish securities fraud
violation because they "failed to generate a genuine issue of fact as to marketability"),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1924 (1990).
'33 See, e.g., Peil, 806 F.2d at 1163 (noting that "a well-developed market can
reasonably be presumed to respond to even a single material misrepresentation or
omission concerning a stock.., traded in that market").
134 Blackie itself developed the presumption largely in practical terms. The link
between the theoretical presumption and the efficient market hypothesis was largely
the product of the most insightful judicial discussion of the theory, in In re LTV
Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1980), which concluded that in
efficient markets "[t]he market is acting as the unpaid agent of the investor,
informing him that given all the information available to it, the values of the stock is
worth the market price." Id. at 143; see also Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d
356, 360-61 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing the economic doctrine and the judicial
development of the fraud-on-the-market theory), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
Although LTV was heavily influenced by economic reasoning, it was candid enough
to acknowledge the limitations of the statistical studies supporting the hypothesis.
Because of practical aspects and the theory's predating of the SEC's integration
project, few courts cite the SEC's work as authority in fraud-on-the-market cases. An
exception is Finkel, 817 F.2d at 361 n.13. The academic commentary, on the other
hand, has emphasized the SEC's acceptance of the efficient market theory. See, e.g.,
Black, supra note 132, at 468 (stating "[t]he SEC explicitly recognized the efficient
market thesis ... by its adoption of the integrated disclosure system"); see also
Pickholz & Horahan, supra note 69, at 945 (noting that the SEC has accepted the
efficient market theory, but that such acceptance has been partial and grudging).
15 See, e.g., Black, supra note 132, at 437 (stating that the fraud-on-the-market
theory streamlines securities fraud litigation and makes class actions possible, thus
minimizing difficult issues of proof, such as reliance). The fraud-on-the-market
theory, however, is not the only mechanism for shifting the burden of proof with
respect to reliance. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972),
the Supreme Court authorized a presumption of reliance in a case based primarily
on nondisclosure rather than an affirmative misrepresentation, suggesting that it is
difficult to prove reliance in a transaction involving a failure to disclose. See id. at
153. Courts have also granted a presumption of reliance for similar reasons in cases
involving broad schemes to defraud, as opposed to specific communicative acts. See,
e.g., Competitive Assocs. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811,
814 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that in a comprehensive scheme to defraud, plaintiff is not
required to prove reliance on the false financial statements, "but need only allege that
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action as a mechanism for redressing securities fraud would be
diminished severely in its efficacy, if not rendered impotent. The
presumption invites class certification (and a subsequent trial on the
merits) by moving this one issue on which there will be substantial
variation among the plaintiffs to a later stage of the proceeding, and
then only if the defendant wishes to assume the burden of negating
it. The defendant will rarely assume this burden because such
inquiry is prohibitively expensive and subject to a substantial moral
hazard since savvy plaintiff-investors can, if challenged, easily recast
their recollections of subjective motivation to conform to the
presumption. In fact, a defendant who loses on the merits will
probably settle, or contest only the class-wide questions of whether
the fraud had an impact at all on price or on the computation of the
basic measurement of damages. 136 The rebuttable nature of the
presumption is thus largely hypothetical, and the character of
investor reliance is, as a practical matter, relevant to the litigation
only for purposes of determining whether the named plaintiffs'
reliance stories are sufficiently typical so they will be competent
class representatives.1
3 7
Both the practical consequences and the conceptual underpin-
nings of the fraud-on-the-market theory were clearly articulated
when its viability was tested before the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson.138 In that 1988 decision, the Court came down firmly
in the theory's favor, granting the presumption of reliance to a class
of investors who sold stock after a company falsely denied that it
it would not have acted as it did had it known of the information withheld by
defendants").
136 See Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to Measure
Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 884 & n.5 (1990). On
the question of whether the stock price was affected by the fraud, see In re Apple
Computer Securities Litigation, 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
3229 (1990), discussed infra text accompanying notes 183-95.
137 This may not be a very rigorous inquiry. Many courts have indicated that
absent a more specific conflict of interest, a named plaintiff's somewhat different
reliance from that of the class generally should not preclude it from class representa-
tive status. See, e.g., Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 373 (D. Del.
1990) (concluding that "[t]he typicality requirement is satisfied, and factual
differences will not render a claim atypical, if the named plaintiff's claim arises from
the same event or course of conduct and is based upon the same legal theory as the
claims of other class members").
118 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Court's decision was 4-2, with three Justices not
participating. Some have characterized the decision as a plurality holding. That
characterization is not accurate, however, since the decision was made by a majority
of those sitting; it is thus an opinion of the Court with stare decisis effect.
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was engaged in merger negotiations.1 3 9  Rhetorically, Justice
Blackmun's opinion is restrained. It begins with an emphasis on the
pragmatic aspects of granting the presumption, and then suggests
that the Court's decision does not purport to state that markets are
necessarily efficient, leaving that determination to development by
lower courts.
140
Neither is Justice Blackmun's economic reasoning particularly
aggressive in conceptualizing the fraud-on-the-market theory.
Responding to the dissent's claim that he was prematurely writing
a controversial economic theory (the efficiency hypothesis) into
law,14 1 Justice Blackmun wrote that "[f]or purposes of accepting
the presumption of reliance in this case, we need only believe that
market professionals generally consider most publicly announced
material statements about companies, thereby affecting stock market
prices." 14 2 These disclaimers notwithstanding, the Basic decision
leaves relatively little undone for purposes of structuring the theory,
and gives all the necessary guidance as to the situations where the
presumption might be rebutted.143  That guidance holds little
promise for potential defendants, making all the more clear that
I" See id. at 247. For good discussions of what Basic does and does not resolve,
see Ayres, supra note 11; Barbara Black, The Strange Case of Fraud on the Market: A
Label in Search of a Theory, 52 ALB. L. REv. 923, 931-36 (1988); WilliamJ. Carney, The
Limits of the Fraud on the Market Doctrine, 44 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1989); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-
the.Market Theoy, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1990).
140 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-47, 249 & n.29.
141 See id. at 254-55 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his
dissent, Justice White challenged the economic basis underlying the majority's
reasoning, claiming that the efficient market hypothesis remains a controversial and
evolving academic theory, that it is not an established fact, and that courts are ill-
equipped to resolve the debate. See id.
112 Id. at 247 n.24. The Court also stated that in adopting its rebuttable
presumption, "we do not intend conclusively to adopt any particular theory of how
quickly and completely publicly available information is reflected in market price."
Id. at 248 n.28. It did, on the other hand, say that "[r]ecent empirical studies have
tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market price of shares traded on well-
developed markets reflects all publicly available information, and, hence, any material
misrepresentations." Id. at 246.
For a critique of Basic that adopts something of a noise theory perspective and
draws on some of that literature, see L. Brett Lockwood, Comment, The Fraud-on-the-
Market Theory: A Contrarian View, 38 EMORY L.J. 1269 (1989).
14s The Court gave examples: (1) a situation where the alleged fraud had no price
impact because market professionals did not believe the misstatement or because the
price had already been corrected; and (2) where the plaintiff had to buy or sell the
shares because of some extraneous pressures. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248-49.
894 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:851
reliance will effectively disappear as an element of the cause of
action once the efficiency of the market is established.
Like most of the lower court decisions preceding it, the Basic
decision did not articulate precisely the nature of the reliance on
the "integrity of the market" that is presumed in an appropriate
case, or what is actually supposed to have gone through an
investor's mind for the resulting decision to merit protection.
There are essentially two ways of addressing these issues, both raise
interesting and largely unexplored questions.
One possibility is to insist that the investor's thought process
evinces a genuine belief in the implications of the efficient market
hypothesis. 144  This is not to say that the investor must under-
stand the intricate economic reasoning behind or the empirical
support for the hypothesis, or even necessarily believe that markets
correctly bind stock prices to rational expectations about fundamen-
tal asset value. At the very least, however, we would insist under
this view that to deserve the presumption, an investor should be a
free rider on market efficiency, believing that she cannot outper-
form (or outguess) the market and thus trusting that price is the
best possible indicator of value.
This view of the presumption was apparently taken by the Third
Circuit in a case decided just before Basic: Zlotnick v. TIE Communi-
cations.145 Zlotnick held that a short-seller was not entitled to the
144 See Finkel v. Docutel/Olivetti Corp., 817 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1987)
(asserting that courts have adopted the requirement that in a fraud-on-the-market
case plaintiffs "could prove reliance on 'the supposition that the market price is
validly set and that no suspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price'")
(quoting Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816
(1976)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988). This appears to be the view implicit in
Macey & Miller, supra note 139, at 1089 ("[P]laintiffs are entitled to rely on the price
decoding and setting mechanisms of market professionals."). See also Jonathan R.
Macey, The Fraud on the Market Theoy: Some Preliminay Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
923, 925-26 (1989) (discussing whether it is reasonable to presume that all investors
rely on the integrity of the market when they purchase securities). But see Macey et
al., supra note 11, at 1021 (suggesting that causation is the real issue and thus the
relevant inquiry is "whether the defendants' misstatements or omissions affected the
market price of th[e] security"). Many other commentators, such as Carney, supra
note 139, seem to suggest that this represents the intellectual underpinnings of the
fraud-on-the-market theory, but subtly expand their articulation to protect a larger
class. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
145 836 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1988). Zlotnick makes a distinction between reliance on
market price and reliance on the market itself; it concludes that only the former is
protected. See id. at 823. Zlotnick is not cited in Basic, although the Court did rely
heavily on another Third Circuit decision, Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir.
1986). See Basic, 485 U.S. at 241-49.
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presumption of reliande because by definition short-selling implies
a belief that the stock is overvalued, and will soon decline in
price.' 46 Such a 'belief thus does not evince reliance on the
integrity of the market price that prevailed at the time of the
transaction.
This articulation is conceptually coherent, a direct way of tying
the investor's thought processes to a positive theory of market
efficiency. Moreover, it survives even if one posits a noisy stock
market.1 47 Although noise theorists assume that stock prices
diverge significantly from underlying asset values, they have not
established the existence of any trading rule or strategy that permits
the exploitation of noise. 148 A reasonable person can simulta-
neously be skeptical about the short-term rationality of stock prices
and yet conclude that it is not worth trying to outguess them by
engaging in personal analysis or paying for research. No doubt
many investors fall in this category.
Instead, the problem with this articulation is the resulting
overbreadth of the application of the fraud-on-the-market theory.
One of the ironies in the development of the theory, if understood
this way, is that it uses the efficient market hypothesis in the one
way it is not meant to be used: as a predictor of the behavior of
individual investors. As we have seen, the efficiency hypothesis
states that market prices behave as if investors were rational and
invest resources in information only to the limited point of positive
expected return. 149 Nothing in the hypothesis denies what most
popular accounts assume: that much information searching and
trading by investors, from institutions on down, is done in the
(perhaps erroneous) belief that undervalued or overvalued stocks
exist and can systematically be discovered.1 50 Noise theorists only
146 See Zlotnick, 836 F.2d at 822-23.
147 See Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 907, 913-15 (1989).
148 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
149 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
150 The phenomenon has given rise to an important topic in the literature, the
"Efficiency Paradox". This paradox explores the extent to which efficiency depends
on the presence of a critical mass of investors who disregard its rational implications.
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 622-26. As Gilson and Kraakman show, the
paradox is consistent with the evidence on efficiency if one takes into account the
costs of information acquisition: there must be a positive expectation of return to
stay in the business. See id. In this sense, there is an "'equilibrium degree of
disequilibrium.'" Id. at 623 (quoting Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 6, at 393). This
is one more illustration of the point that markets and stocks are not efficient or
inefficient in some readily determinable sense; rather, they exhibit relative degrees
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stress that the behavior of this class of speculators can be driven by
pseudo-signals and cognitive illusions, as well as by fundamental
analysis, thus moving prices away from value more frequently. and
for longer periods of time.15 1
Unfortunately-perhaps because of the long primacy of the
efficient market hypothesis152 -there is very little empirical data
to tell us what percentage of investors are free-riding believers in
market efficiency and what percentage are habitually trying to beat
the market. 153 The effect of the fraud-on-the-market presumption
as applied, however, is to assure that both groups are compensated.
To the extent that speculators are included but do not deserve
protection because of the way the theory is understood, the result
is substantial overcompensation. The realities of securities litigation
are such that this overcompensation will not be trivial, but probably
measurable in the millions of dollars. Certainly, it affects the
bargaining dynamics associated with pre-trial settlement.
154
of efficiency. An efficient market is a shorthand way of describing a market with a
high level of-but not perfect-efficiency.
151 See supra notes 22-45 and accompanying text.
152 See supra text accompanying note 30.
153 The dearth of data on investor behavior is remarkable. A now dated but still
often cited study began the inquiry into this issue, noting how much more work
needed to be done to gain useful insights into the investing process. See Ronald C.
Lease et al., The Individual Investor Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413 (1974)
[hereinafter Lease et al., Individual Investor]; see also Ronald C. Lease et al., Market
Segmentation: Evidence on the Individual Investor, FIN. ANALYSTSJ., Sept./Oct. 1976,
at 53 (surveying different groups of investors and their investment behavior). One
of the insights resulting from the 1974 study, consistent with the behavioral literature,
was that although most investors expressed skepticism about the average investor's
ability to beat the market, most considered themselves investors of above-average
skill. See Lease et al., Individual Investor, supra, at 431-32. Some empirical data can
be found in ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 74, at 269-304, published in
1977. Robert Shiller has also done some informal surveys on investor attitudes and
behaviors. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
154 Securities cases are often settled due not only to the merits but also the
conflicts of interest faced by the lawyers involved in the action. See Geoffrey P.
Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 190 (1987) (noting
that attorneys will be inclined to accept the defendant's settlement offer, although the
plaintiff might be better off going to trial). Plainly, the outer limit of the damage
exposure will substantially affect bargaining outcomes. See, e.g., Robert Cooter et al.,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225, 237 (1982) (stating that "[ain increase in the value of the trial ... will
make trial more attractive, and the player will demand more); ef. Janet C. Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV.
497, 596 (1991) (concluding that securities class actions are not resolved in a manner
predicted by the economic model).
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There is a different way of articulating the form of protectable
reliance in a fraud-on-the-market case-probably the better reading
of Basic-that avoids this overbreadth. Perhaps investors deserve
inclusion in the protected class simply if they relied on the market
to be undistorted by fraud. 55 Under this articulation (and in
contrast to Ziotnick), even speculators should be compensated since
they implicitly assume that the market price has been set in an
unbiased fashion even if they believe it is too high or too low.
"Who would knowingly roll the dice," asked Justice Blackmun in
justifying the presumption of reliance, "in a crooked crap
game?"156 Indeed, a subsequent district court indicated that it
finds Zotnick's validity "somewhat questionable in light of Basic," an
apparent endorsement of this broader articulation.
1 57
While this articulation avoids the overbreadth concern, it
effectively unties the protected form of reliance from any meaning-
ful belief about market efficiency. Efficiency does not prevent
fraud:158  indeed, the very existence of the fraud-on-the-market
theory is premised on the idea that credible lies can and do affect
the prices of widely-traded stocks.1 59 In a rational market, traders
assume the risk of fraud, with prices adjusted to reflect some
average amount of predictable misbehavior. 160  So understood,
155 See Carney, supra note 139, at 1277-78; Fischel, supra note 147, at 920. But see
Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory, supra note 9, at 11 (asserting that a presumption
of reliance should be abandoned).
156 Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., 555 F. Supp. 535,
538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)). Further support in Basic for this idea comes from one of the
examples Justice Blackmun gave as to how the presumption of reliance might be
rebutted. He indicated that a person who did not trust the market would have no
direct or indirect connection with the fraud if extraneous events (antitrust
considerations, for example) forced him to sell. See id. at 249. The forced-sale aspect
would be unnecessaryifthe lack of trust itself disqualified the plaintiff. Similarly, the
Blackie case also assumes reliance on an unrigged market. See Blackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
157 In re Western Union Sec. Litig., 120 F.R.D. 629, 637 (D.NJ. 1988); see also
Deutschman v. Beneficial Corp., 132 F.R.D. 359, 371 (D. Del. 1990) (holding that
options traders have engaged in the requisite reliance, even though they are betting
on a price movement).
158 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
159 Some have suggested that the fraud-on-the-market theory seems internally
inconsistent in its assumption that fraud can be successful in an efficient market. See,
e.g., Black, supra note 139, at 933-34 (arguing that the efficient market hypothesis
contradicts the notion of false information having great impact on stock prices, since
traders disregard such information upon recognition of its falsity). Under the semi-
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis, however, there is no reason to
expect that private information will necessarily be reflected in stock price. See Macey
& Miller, supra note 139, at 1078-79.
160 See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons".• Quality Uncertainty and
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the articulation that investors rely on the price of the stock to be
undistorted by fraud is either unreasonable (a cognitive illusion
based on excessive optimism, not a rational expectation) or, more
persuasively, a statement that investors are entitled as a matter of law
to rely on the stock price as the product of unbiased market forces
rather than fraud or manipulation.
Why should we, however, limit the presumption to traders in
efficient organized markets?161 The efficient market hypothesis
cannot take credit for the insight that information affects pric-
es. 162 As Justice Blackmun acknowledged, an organizing principle
of securities regulation since its inception is that misinformation
distorts the prices of stocks, 163 small as well as large-albeit some-
times more slowly and imprecisely with respect to the former. A
buyer of a small over-the-counter stock no doubt holds the same
expectation of the absence of fraud (otherwise why would she roll
the dice, to repeatJustice Blackmun's rhetorical question), and does
not act in an appreciably more unreasonable fashion in so do-
ing.164 In this light, discriminating between investors in small and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 495-96 (1970) (analyzing the "costs of
dishonesty" in the automobile market context and stating that, at least in theory, such
costs can be evaluated); Carney, supra note 139, at 1278 ("[I]nvestors will assume each
security possesses the average amount of fraud.").
161 See Macey et al., supra note 11, at 1021 (arguing that the relevant inquiry in
determining whether a presumption of reliance should be granted to the plaintiff "is
not whether the market for the security is efficient, but whether the defendants'
misstatements or omissions affected the price of that security"). We should put to the
side for a moment the issue of granting the presumption of reliance when there is no
organized market at all (for example, the initial public offering). See iifra notes
169-70 and accompanying text.
162 In fact, the Court's articulation of the economic basis for the fraud-on-the-
market theory, see supra text accompanying note 142, is little more than the idea that
information affects prices-something that is undeniably true, but by no means limited
to instances subsumed in the efficiency hypothesis. See Ayres, supra note 11, at 983-
84. For a similar insight regarding the pre-Basic case law, see ROBERT C. CLARK,
CORPORATE LAW 331 (1986).
163 See, e.g., COX ET AL., supra note 98, at 679-81 (providing an overview of the
history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, its purpose, and its reach); Steve Thel,
The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV.
385, 391 (1990) (noting that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in its primary
concern with securities pricing, "provides for extensive control over several critical
factors affecting prices, including production and dissemination of information").
164 As noted earlier, it is likely that the incidence of fraud is relatively higher
among smaller stocks than larger ones. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
This difference, however, is a matter of degree, and probably a small one. In no way
could it be asserted that reliance on the absence of fraud is per se reasonable for
efficiently traded stocks and per se unreasonable for thinly traded ones.
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large companies makes no conceptual sense.165 The only impor-
tant question is whether the price was distorted. Given the well-
acknowledged practical and conceptual difficulties of determining
what is or is not a truly efficient market-various conundra that all
stem from treating efficiency as a yes/no question rather than one
that varies as a matter of degree depending on the type of issuer
and the type of information 166 -there are good reasons to want to
avoid this sort of threshold inquiry. Yet Basic seems to insist on
it.
167
165 The same point holds even if, as some commentators have suggested, we play
down the Basic Court's insistence that individual reliance remain an element of all
lOb-5 cases and instead follow a pure causation approach. A simpler model of the
fraud-on-the-market theory would be that so long as fraud distorts the stock price,
anyone injured in fact by buying at too high a price or selling at too low a price is
entitled to sue. This would avoid all the conceptual problems that come from
fictionalizing the reliance interest, and would be a more realistic response to the ways
that modern securities markets operate. Again, however, there would be no basis for
introducing the artificial efficient/nonefficient dichotomy. So long as the misinfor-
mation affected the stock price-as it surely would even in many cases involving thinly
traded stocks--causation could be shown with respect to all subsequent purchases
until the truth was exposed. Except for its evidentiary role in helping determine
whether (and for how long) the fraud had an impact, the efficient market hypothesis
would have little to do with either understanding or applying a causation-based fraud-
on-the-market theory.
166 See supra note 68. Macey and Miller note correctly that a determination of
whether the market is sufficiently efficient to warrant applying the presumption of
reliance depends on the nature of the fraud. See Macey & Miller, supra note 139, at
1087. The finance literature recognizes that information is assimilated into price
slowly to the extent that it is either highly subjective and difficult to evaluate, or
available in the first instance only to a small number of market participants. See id.
at 1083-85; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 558. A subtle, hard-to-evaluate piece
of information about a large issuer may well take longer to become impounded than
a dramatic bit of information about a thinly traded stock. In their most recent work,
Macey and Miller explicitly suggest moving away from an efficiency requirement. See
Macey et al., supra note 11, at 1021.
167 For post-Basic cases struggling with the interpretation of what an efficient
market is, see Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 197-98 (6th Cir. 1990),
Hurley v. FDIC, 719 F. Supp. 27,34 (D. Mass. 1989), Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp.
1264, 1276-87 (D.NJ. 1989), and Harman v. LyphoMed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522,525-26
(N.D. Il. 1988). There is a split among the courts over what factors should be
considered in assessing whether a security is traded in an efficient market. Some
make the determination based on easily determined factors (for example, whether
securities are exchange-traded or whether they are eligible to use Form S-3), see
Freeman, 915 F.2d at 199, while others insist on a more fact-specific inquiry, see
Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1281-87. In the middle are courts willing to accept a prima
facie showing of efficiency at the class certification stage, leaving open the possibility
of more intensive inquiry later. See Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525-26.
As noted earlier, a separate aspect of the fraud-on-the-market theory is that upon
a showing of materiality, impact on price is presumed, subject to rebuttal by the
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Where does this leave us? If our second reading of Basic's
conception of reliance is right, the development of the fraud-on-the-
market theory by the courts is reminiscent of the SEC's articulation
of its integrated disclosure system. 168 The efficient market hy-
pothesis is invoked, but in ways that on close inspection are neither
necessary nor sufficient to the ultimate conclusion. The structure
of the reasoning in Basic is much like that of the progenitor,
Blackie-a decision that made no explicit use of the efficiency
hypothesis, finding it necessary only to state (without resort to
citation) that prices respond to information causing harm when
there is fraud. The important feature of the presumption of
reliance is its pragmatic consequence: absent some sort of pre-
sumption that removes the burden of proving reliance on the part
of each individual plaintiff, securities class actions involving
dispersed investors with relatively small claims would essentially
disappear. Given both the deterrent and compensatory role these
actions are widely believed to play, such a result seems unaccept-
able. If the efficient market hypothesis had not provided an
appealing rationale in which to cloak the process of burden shifting,
something else would have to have been found.
Unlike its use in the integration project, however, the efficiency
rhetoric also has a substantive effect: the unnecessary limitation to
"efficient" organized markets. 169 Efficiency-as-justification subtly
defendant. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text. Basic supports this second
presumption, although it is not extensively discussed and there is some residual
ambiguity. See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 913-17. Arguably, the efficient
market hypothesis is the justification for this step, making inquiry into the efficiency
of the market a necessary determination. Three points are worth noting, however.
First, unlike the individualized inquiry of the reliance discussion, the efficiency of the
market inquiry addresses an issue (price impact) that is common to the plaintiff class
as a whole. Second, it is by no means clear that the same presumption of reliance
would not be made even in the absence of a showing of efficiency. For example, the
defendant may have better access to the facts, or the matter could be considered
sufficiently difficult to prove that it would be unfair to allocate the burden to the
innocent plaintiffs. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
152-54 (1972) (creating a presumption of reliance in a nondisclosure case). Finally,
even if the efficiency hypothesis is ajustification for the presumption of reliance, the
presumption relies on a relatively noncontroversial form of the hypothesis that
assumes that stock prices in organized markets, noisy or not, are highly responsive
to information.
168 For discussions of the SEC's articulation of its integrated disclosure system, see
Fox, supra note 91, at 1025-28, and Nicholas, supra note 91, at 18-20.
169 The practical consequence of this restriction is hard to evaluate. As noted
above, courts have a variety ofjustifications besides the fraud-on-the-market theory
to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proving reliance, and these could prove useable
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becomes efficiency-as-prerequisite, an instance of the economic
mode of discourse restricting, rather than expanding, the cognitive
process of law-formulation. 170 There is probably a second unfor-
tunate consequence as well. Noticeably absent from the Basic
decision is a careful consideration of the costs associated with a
broad liability rule, in terms of damage awards that are dispropor-
tionate to the level of misconduct or in terms of its chilling effect
on voluntary publicity, harming investors rather than helping
them.
171
to the plaintiffs in a thin-market case. See supra notes 132 & 135.
170 An example of this narrowing process is in the continuing debate over whether
to grant a presumption of reliance in cases involving offerings of new securities,
where there is no preexisting market. See supra note 132. If efficiency is crucial to
the process, the answer is an easy "no." See, e.g., Freeman, 915 F.2d at 198 (holding
that "the rationale supporting... presumption of reliance does not apply when
securities are not traded in an efficient market" and thus there would be no
presumption "if a primary market for newly issued ... bonds is not efficient");
Carney, supra note 139, at 1284-91 (arguing that "assumptions about the fair
(unbiased) pricing of financial assets must be confined to those markets where market
forces are powerful enough to act with relative speed on new information").
Much more broadly, however, the question in new-securities-offerings cases is
whether investors buying new offerings are entitled to a presumption that but for the
fraud, the securities would not have been marketed. That inquiry is in turn based on
the reasonableness of that reliance; whether purchasers are entitled to assume that
gatekeepers would have prevented or ameliorated the effects of the fraud. Although
this question is an interesting one, it is worth noting that such reliance is not
substantially different in character from the assumption that fraud has not distorted
an organized market. Fraud is foreseeable in primary and secondary market settings.
One can imagine particular public offerings that are structured in such a way as to
make the lack of a specific inquiry by purchasers not unreasonable.
More generally, one might well conclude that optimal deterrence would be
furthered by a presumption of reliance in all cases involving large-scale distribution
or trading of securities. In Freeman, the dissentingjudge claimed that the majority
misunderstood plaintiff's claim in focusing excessively on efficiency. See Freeman, 915
F.2d at 200-01 (Guy, Jr.,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
171 Basic is a good example. The fraud was in falsely denying the existence of
ongoing merger negotiations. There was no corruption or self-dealing by the
managers involved. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 227-28. The evidence suggested that
management was simply trying to protect the confidentiality of the negotiations to
give them a better chance of success. See id. at 236. Yet assuming liability, the
company (that is, its existing shareholders) would possibly be forced to pay damages
of tens of millions of dollars for what was essentially a utilitarian lie. At first glance,
this seems to bejust compensation-at least under causation-based reasoning. But the
net economic harm of the lie is far less, for in the absence of trading by the company
or its insiders, each bad sale by one investor is offset by a windfall purchase by
another. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities
Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 618-25 (1985); Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Approach
to Misleading Corporate Announcements, Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 52 ALB. L. REV. 957,
968-72 (1988). That is cold comfort to the disappointed traders in the specific case.
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What the precise analytical structure should be takes us well
beyond our particular focus, the role of the efficient market
hypothesis as an intellectual construct in securities litigation.
Understood clearly, what is important is that none of the hard
questions generated under this heading are really answerable by
reference to any interesting positive theory regarding market
efficiency. Professors Macey and Miller have aptly described their
view of the fraud-on-the-market theory as "good finance, bad
economics."172 One may quibble with the first judgment they
make,17 3 but that judgment is largely academic. The dilemma is
in their second judgment,174 regarding the cost-benefit calculus.
Unfortunately, in so wrapping itself in the rhetoric of finance theory
that its reasoning took on the aura of intellectual inevitability, the
Basic opinion may well have missed the point.
What happens to the fraud-on-the-market theory if we assume
a noisy stock market? As noted earlier, a noisy view is consistent
with either the idea that misinformation affects stock prices or,
because of the apparently unexploitable character of noise, a
For active investors however, there will be, over time, a netting out of the windfalls
and losses from even the most distorted markets.
For this reason, coupled with the rather high social costs associated with class
action-type litigation, it may make more sense to mold liability standards in open
market cases with a view toward optimal deterrence rather than toward ad hoc
compensation. In terms of optimal deterrence, large dollar amount recovery,
generated by the fraud-on-the-market theory for the company's existing shareholders,
will often be excessive. In all likelihood, there is a threat that large recovery "over-
deters" the release of information to the marketplace, chilling the release of all but
the minimum issuer-specific information-especially chilling forward-looking
information not required in Exchange Act filings.
Some commentators have suggested, for precisely this reason, retaining the
broad class aggregation permitted by the fraud-on-the-market theory, while limiting
recovery substantively to situations of true corruption by corporate managers of the
sort found in classic schemes to defraud. See Karjala, supra, at 983-84. Others have
suggested a similar limitation to situations where the fraud did not involve an attempt
to protect a corporate property right. See Macey & Miller, supra note 139, at 1066-76.
Alternatively, the damages recoverable by the broadly defined class could be limited
to less than the aggregate out-of-pocket measure, as in the law of insider trading-
although this would be hard to accomplish without statutory reform. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra, at 642 n.44. Finally, Ian Ayres has suggested allowing corporations
to opt out of a duty of truthfulness, albeit with explicit disclaimers. See Ayres, supra
note 11, at 947-64.
172 Macey & Miller, supra note 139, at 1059.
173 See id. at 1062 (determining that the Basic Court's opinion successfully applied
the principles of corporate finance).
174 See id. at 1062, 1079 (concluding that the Basic Court struggled unsuccessfully
with simple economic principles).
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rational decision to invest without trying to beat the market.
175
But if investors as a group unwisely overreact to a bit of misinforma-
tion, should the defendant therefore be held responsible to all
traders? The underlying tension has long been part of securities
regulation. Reckless plaintiffs cannot recover under Rule 10b-
5;176 we expect investors to conform to a basic model of rational
behavior in which they try to make informed investment decisions
or at least thoughtfully free-ride on others.
The common experience from which the behavioralists (and
noise theorists) draw suggests, of course, that some segment of
investors is not conforming to this model, and their behavior may
be the behavior that affects the price. Once again, however, we do
not know as an empirical matter how large this segment is likely to
be, and for the same reasons that led to Basic's reliance presump-
tion 177 we cannot make the reasonableness of reliance an inves-
tor-specific issue in litigation. A noisy view of the stock markets,
thus, simply strengthens the need to take careful account of the
costs associated with the presumption of reliance. It would not be
surprising if a court adhering to a noisy view introduced subtle
restrictions to limit recovery in perceived overreaction cases. For
example, such a result might be accomplished by implicitly assessing
the reasonableness of reliance. Indeed, we shall see a possible
example shortly.
178
2. Fraud's Impact on Stock Prices
Putting aside the question of who bears the burden of proof, the
fraud-on-the-market theory assumes that plaintiffs recover only if,
and to the extent that, the fraud distorted the market price.
Although an investor who can demonstrate actual reliance of a
175 See supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522,
529 (7th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that the plaintiff might "not [be] eligible to
recover if guilty of 'gross conduct'" (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp.,
553 F.2d 1033, 1048 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977))). On the other hand,
there is the view that even the gullible deserve protection. See, e.g., Margaret V.
Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs Be
Denied Recoveiy?, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 96, 141 (1985) (concluding that "the duty of
care has no proper place in Rule lob-5 litigation. A plaintiff's carelessness should no
longer bar recovery for intentional securities fraud.").
177 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47 (stating that Congress relied on the premise that
securities markets are affected by misinformation when it enacted legislation to
facilitate an investor's reliance on the integrity of the markets).
178 See infra text accompanying note 195.
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nonreckless sort in a case under Rule 10b-5 does not in theory lose
her claim simply because other investors knew the truth,179 the
fraud-on-the-market presumption properly shifts the inquiry to
whether the market as a whole was fooled. Moreover, this same
factual inquiry is present even beyond cases of presumed reliance.
Under the rubric of loss causation, plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5
actions generally have the burden of showing that the fraud led to
the damages alleged. Specifically, plaintiffs must show that
discovery of the misstatement or omission, not some extraneous
factor, was the proximate cause of the subsequent drop in price in
a defrauded buyer's case.180 If the market was not fooled by the
fraud, any price movement after discovery or correction would by
definition be attributable to other factors. This concept, moreover,
is effectively built into the standard measure of damages in an open-
market fraud case-the out-of-pocket measure, which allows the
plaintiff to recover the difference between the transaction price and
the "value" it would have had on that date had the truth been
known.181
At this point litigants frequently invoke the efficient market
hypothesis to establish or negate the causal relationship between the
fraud and the market price. The case law on this interesting issue
is sparse, however, because of the tendency of litigants to settle
179 Cf In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that "[i]n order to avoid Rule IOb-5 liability, any material information [not
disclosed] must be transmitted to the public with a degree of intensity and credibility
sufficient to effectively counterbalance any misleading impression"), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 3229 (1990). Such a plaintiff might have difficulty showing loss causation,
however.
180 See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Resources Co., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir.) (holding
that "the plaintiff must allege and prove that, but for the defendant's wrongdoing, the
plaintiff would not have incurred the harm"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2590 (1990);
Theresa A. Gabaldon, Causation, Courts, and Congress: A Study of Contradiction in the
Federal Securities Laws, 31 B.C. L. REv. 1027, 1034 (1990) ("The plaintiff usually must
introduce evidence from which reasonable persons might conclude that.., the injury
in question was caused by defendant's conduct . . ."); Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent
Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong,
66 TEX. L. REV. 469, 516 (1988) (noting that "most courts place the burden of
establishing loss causation on the plaintiff").
181 See, e.g., Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir.
1976) (Sneed, J., concurring) (maintaining that purchasers "who disposed of their
stock after disclosure are entitled to recover the difference between the price and
value of the stock on the date of their purchase even [if] theyultimately sold the stock
for more than they paid"); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 171, at 651 (noting that
adjustments for market changes result in "conventional out-of-pocket-loss measures").
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before this stage of the proceeding.1 8 2 Furthermore, the efficien-
cy reasoning that aids plaintiffs in gaining class certification turns
upon them and bites them at this stage. There are effectively two
types of cases dealing with this issue.
a. The Partially Informed Market
The first type of case concerns fraud that is arguably palpable,
such as cases where there is evidence that a significant number of
investors either knew the truth or were skeptical about the allegedly
misleading statements. In In re Apple Computer Securities Litiga-
tion,18 3 for example, summary judgment was granted for the
defendant on most issues upon the largely uncontradicted showing
that financial analysts and the financial press were widely discount-
ing Apple's excessive public optimism about two of its new prod-
ucts.1 84 This showing thus negated any price impact, even though
some investors may have been fooled.18 5 Although the Apple
court-and many commentators 8 6-viewed this reasoning as a
largely noncontroversial extension of the fraud-on-the-market
theory, it in fact deals with a very different phenomenon and
potentially makes a far stronger efficiency claim. The Basic
decision, as we have seen, is premised on the simple idea that
misinformation affects stock prices.18 7 The Apple court's opinion,
on the other hand, seems to say that the truth will necessarily
prevent misinformation from having any such effect, simply by
virtue of its availability. This presumably rests on the belief that
smart-money arbitrage will operate to counter the influence of any
gullible investors.
182 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 884.
183 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3229 (1990). For similar
dispositions, see In re Convergent Technologies Securities Litigation, 721 F. Supp.
1133 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,211, at 91,109 (9th Cir.
Aug. 27, 1991), and In re LTV Securities Litigation, 88 F.R.D. 134, 148 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
'8 See Apple, 886 F.2d at 1118-19.
185 See id. at 1116. The court noted over 20 publicly available articles in the
financial press that stressed the risks Apple was taking with the Lisa computer and the
underlying problems flowing from those risks. It rejected plaintiffs' claim that,
because a significant price movement in Apple stock occurred immediately after the
fraud, a triable issue was necessarily presented. See id.
186 See, e.g., Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 920-21 (asserting that the Apple
court correctly applied the fraud-on-the-market theory).
187 See supra note 142, 177.
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Following the efficiency hypothesis, this reasoning is clearly
correct, and the Apple decision thus seems to make a fairly strong
claim about market efficiency. Certainly, the court's opinion
contains aggressive rhetoric:
Where both [false-good and accurate-bad news] are transmitted to
the market with roughly equal intensity and credibility, the market
will receive complete and accurate information. Informed
investors will invest in light of an accurate appreciation of the
relevant risks. Those investors who know only of the Chairman's
optimism may overvalue Apple stock .... However, it is a basic
assumption of the securities laws that the partially-informed
investors will cancel each other out, and that Apple's stock price
will accurately reflect all relevant information .... [T]he market
... will not be misled."' 8
This sort of reasoning must be used with care, especially in
summary judgment settings. Much of recent noise theory argues
that there can be a contrived run-up in the price of a stock based on
hopes and illusions that the smart money either waits out or
joins.18 9 The mere fact that a critical mass of smart money is not
fooled will not necessarily prevent the stock price from being
influenced by fraud.
On careful inspection, however, it seems that the court in Apple
is not nearly as aggressive as it appears at first glance. Most
importantly, the Apple court's decision requires that the truthful
information be available to the market "with roughly equal intensi-
ty, "19 something that is irrelevant under classical efficiency
reasoning.19' Classical theory states that truthful information will
be impounded simply if it is publicly available. The intensity
qualifier is, if anything, more consistent with a noise perspective in
which information must compete with misinformation.
For fraud to have an impact notwithstanding contrary public
information, we would expect to find visible evidence of widespread
"optimism"19 2 to support the speculative bubble. Press coverage
that is decidedly negative indicates-although it does not prove-the
contrary. In the Apple scenario, it is probable that the price impact
of the professionally disbelieved optimism was nil. The court's
188 Apple, 886 F.2d at 1114 (footnote omitted).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
190 Apple, 886 F.2d at 1114.
191 See generally supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
192 "Optimism," in the context of this discussion, refers to those enthusiastic
pseudo-signals disseminated by a corporation for public consumption.
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decision, then, is methodologically troublesome only to the extent
that it is read to turn what will sometimes be a subtle factual inquiry
into a matter of routine summary judgment.
193
There may be more to Apple than that, however; quite apart
from its descriptive methodology, the case can also be read as
having a normative dimension. If we believe that information
discounting Apple's enthusiasm for its new products was readily
available to the public, we might well ask whether Apple's optimism
should have affected the stock's price, regardless of whether it
actually had any effect. It may well be, as was suggested earli-
er, 194 that a court inclined to take a noisy view of the stock
markets will somehow seek to control liability excesses of the fraud-
on-the-market theory by implicitly questioning the reasonableness
of the reliance in cases like Apple. Whether the Apple court sought
to do this is not clear, but its decision certainly did have that
effect.
195
193 For an example of a court's refusal to accept the general availability of
information as precluding plaintiffs' fraud-on-the-market claim, see In re Western
Union Securities Litigation, 120 F.R.D. 629 (D.NJ. 1988). This decision has been
criticized by Cornell & Morgan, who argue that the court did not seem to fully
understand the implications of the fraud-on-the-market theory. See Cornell &
Morgan, supra note 136, at 921-23.
cSee supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
195 For a case dearly questioning whether an open-market trader is entitled to
ignore publicly available information, see Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund
v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The investor cannot ask a court to
focus on the lie and ignore the remaining pieces of information already available to
him (or, in the case of a publicly traded security, already available to others and
reflected in the price of the security.)"). Another subtle means of getting to the same
point is to use the concept ofmateriality and engraft onto it the idea that information
is not material if the total mix of available information already contains the truth. See
Roger J. Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the
Total Mix, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 373, 374-86 (1984) (comparing concepts of
materiality with the treatment of materiality in the efficient market model). To the
extent that the efficiency hypothesis is not descriptively accurate, this account loses
its persuasive effect. Even so, it is normatively appealing.
Dennis's article also examines another settingwhere the efficiency hypothesis has
an impact: proxy fraud litigation. See id. at 386-411. Although the collective action
nature of shareholder voting precludes efficiency from being a direct check for fraud,
an examination of market price movements in response to an allegedly tainted vote
may indicate either the absence ofmateriality or the absence of financial harm. See,
e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1247 (7th Cir.) (holding that "when
market value is available and reliable, other factors should not be utilized in
determining [fairness]"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1978); Simon M. Lorne, A
Reappraisal of Fair Shares in Controlled Mergers, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 965-70 (1978)
(analyzing Mills and the confusion inherent in the decision); see also Seaboard World
Airlines v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding the value of
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In much the same genre as the Apple decision is Judge Easter-
brook's opinion in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 1 9 6 which
produced the bit of hyperbole that began this Article: that the SEC
"believes that markets correctly value the securities of well-followed
firms."
197
In Wielgos, an investor brought a class action suit on the part of
purchasers of stock in a public offering by Commonwealth Edison
registered for the shelf on Form S-3. The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant substantially overstated in its filings the expected speed
with which certain nuclear plants would be up and running with
Nuclear Regulatory Commission approval. In fact, it took much
longer for the plants to begin operation, and thus cost the company
much more money. Since the case was brought under section 11 of
the Securities Act, 198 reliance was presumed conclusively not to
be an issue; hence the fraud-on-the-market theory was not at issue.
Instead, Commonwealth Edison's principal defense was that its
projection was not unreasonable, and hence within the safe harbor
of SEC Rule 175.199
Affirming a grant of summary judgment for the defense (and
citing the Apple decision), Judge Easterbrook wrote essentially that
although the assumptions on which the projection was based were
plainly unrealistic, market professionals, at least, knew it.20 0 Thus
(and we should pause at this leap in reasoning), the projection was
not without a reasonable basis.
Though curious in analytical structure, Wielgos produces the
right result if (as Judge Easterbrook suspected) the market was not
fooled. Any post-correction drop in the price of Commonwealth
Edison's stock would have been unrelated to the misleading
projection, reducing damages to zero pursuant to section 11(e).
2 0 '
stock a circumstance relevant in determining the materiality of the allegedly
misleading statement).
196 892 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1989).
197 Id. at 510.
198 See id. at 511-12 (claiming that issuer and underwriters, by underestimating the
completion costs and failing to reveal that application was made for a license, violated
section 11).
199 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1991) (detailing issuers' liability for certain
statements); Wielgos, 892 F.2d at 512-13.
200 See id.
201 See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 74 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988)). See generally Akerman v. Oryx
Comm., Inc., 810 F.2d 336, 341-43 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the section 11(e)
formula for calculating damages is "the difference between the amount paid for the
security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public) and
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In this sense, the interesting question is the same as that posed in
Apple: if we shift to a noisy stock market perspective, is there
anything to lead us to expect, notwithstanding the smart money's
alleged appreciation of the foolishness of Commonwealth Edison's
projection, that enough other investors might have responded
irrationally to this information in a way that affected the stock's
price?
2 2
b. Measuring the Impact of Fraud
The second kind of case is where the fraud is effectively
concealed, leaving no question of whether the market was fooled,
but rather poses the question of how much the market was fooled.
Take, for instance, a case where a bank holding company misstates
some accounting data-miscalculating a loan-loss reserve, for
example. A few.months later, a newspaper does a story about the
bank, prompting the filing of a corrective disclosure on Form 8-K
a few weeks later. For a few days after the story, the stock price
drops, and it does so again immediately after the filing. Although
instinctively the price drop seems related to the disclosure, one in
fact must rule out various other issuer-specific, industry-specific,
and market-wide factors that might independently exert a downward
influence on the price.
Finance theory has led to the creation of a number of statistical
tests to assist in this calculation.203 One is to create a comparable
... the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought" (citation omitted)).
202 The Wielgos opinion does not set forth in detail the evidence one way or
another. There is substantial indication thatJudge Easterbrook would defend this
"truth on the market" theory on normative as well as descriptive grounds. He is the
author of numerous opinions that suggest that plaintiffs should be charged with
having knowledge of all available information. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension
Trust Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 530 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The investor cannot ask
a court to focus on the lie and ignore the remaining pieces of information already
available to him (or, in the case of the publicly traded security, already available to
others and reflected in the price of the security.)").
203 The discussion of methodology that follows is taken largely from Cornell &
Morgan, supra note 136, at 897-911. For an illustration of how this methodology
might be applied in the Basic case itself, seeJanine S. Hiller & Stephen P. Ferris, Use
of Economic Analysis in Fraud on the Market Cases, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 535, 550-57
(1990). For other examples from the literature, seeJared Tobin Finkelstein, Rule 10b-
5 Damage Computation: Application of Financial Theory to Determine Net Economic Loss,
51 FoRD. L. REV. 838, 850-58 (1983); Fischel, supra note 9 at 17-19; PhilipJ. Leas, The
Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 371, 371-85 (1974); Macey et aL., supra note 11, at 1028-49. A difficult problem
in these calculations arises when courts are forced to deal with situations where it is
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index-a hypothetical proxy for the firm in question-that estimates
the returns on the security had there been no fraud. This is done
by calculating backwards from the disclosure date based on
observed pre-fraud correlations between the returns on the stock in
question and those of its industry and the market as a whole (the
familiar beta measure in modern portfolio theory).20 4 Another is
an event-study approach, which assumes that price and value are
identical except on days when fraud-related information has been
disclosed; for those days, a prediction of the sort made above is
substituted. Once again, the value line is then calculated backwards
in time from the date of disclosure.
20 5
Although similar, these two methods can produce different
results. The comparable-index approach is easily biased toward
overcompensation, since it attributes to the fraud all declines not
explainable by reference to industry and market factors. Other
negative information about the firm could easily have entered the
market as well, especially if there is a long time-lag between the
fraud and the correction. 20 6  In contrast, the event-study ap-
proach tends toward undercompensation to the extent that the
market frequently figures out some or all of the truth prior to the
corrective disclosure.
20 7
Still, both approaches are firmly and explicitly grounded in
assumptions generated by the efficient market hypothesis. Both
posit that issuer stock-price movements can be related in a definable
way to industry- and market-price movements, and that the value
line converges with price upon full disclosure. 20 8 In theory, both
tests become weaker in their explanatory power if one adopts a
noisy view of the stock markets.
Pragmatically, however, there may be little reason for concern.
Whatever their artificiality as formal expositions, no one has yet
suggested a better way to assess intrinsic value; 20 9 the alternatives,
unclear when the truth entered the market.
204 See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 897-98.
205 See id. at 899-900.
206,See Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 903.
207 See id. at 905-06. In addition, of course, both techniques will give rise to
substantial disputes about what figures to use in the calculations. The judgmental
elements remain substantial.
208 See id. at 906-11.
209 See supra text accompanying note 64. This emphasis on the best available
measure is also found in Macey ct al., supra note 11, at 1042-49. There is, of course,
the possibility that alternative models will evolve. For instance, the tendency of stock
prices to revert to mean suggests that some sort of curve smoothing approach to
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such as reliance on expert valuations, are no more determinate or
realistic. In fact, stripped of their rigor, these models bear a strong
resemblance to extrapolation methodologies that have long been
used to measure damages under conditions of uncertainty in fields
such as contract law. There is no reason to expect that in situations
where both parties choose their particular models outcomes will be
skewed systematically in favor of plaintiffs or defendants. Hence,
in a rough sense, their application by ajudge or jury will be as fair
as alternative solutions. Furthermore, since most damage/loss
causation issues are resolved by settlement rather than adjudication,
reference to this methodology may sufficiently orient the negotia-
tions in an objective-although potentially artificial-fashion so that
bargaining is facilitated. As Professors Morgan and Cornell have
said, "[i]f the litigants' debate can be reduced to the question of
how to measure the market portfolio or how to estimate Beta,
settlement is probably near."
210
3. Again, Why Efficiency?
The foregoing analysis suggests that the courts' use of the
efficient market hypothesis is somewhat stronger than the SEC's
use, although there is some element of window-dressing here as
well, especially in the fraud-on-the-market theory. It is thus worth
asking why, apart from arguably excessive confidence in its
certainty, the courts have so completely embraced this hypothesis.
Many of the same possibilities considered with respect to the
SEC bear repetition here. The academic influence, the tendency
toward advocacy, and even the political dimension are plausi-
ble. 211 But cases like Apple and Wielgos raise another consider-
ation. In many ways, noise theory taken seriously is a doctrinally
threatening and disruptive idea. The dogma of securities regulation
has long assumed that markets will take on a fair and orderly
character so long as lies are not effectively concealed. Its dominant
image is of the reasonable (if not hyper-rational) investor who is
simply in need of a little regulatory assistance to make thoughtful
long-term valuation may be appropriate.
10 Cornell & Morgan, supra note 136, at 888 n.16; see also id. at 911-12.
211 See, e.g., Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 296, 303-07 (1990)
(discussing the psychology of self-fulfilling beliefs in judicial decisionmaking);
Nicholas S. Zeppos,Judicial Candor and Statutoiy Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 358-
59, 412-13 (1989) (examining critically the theories that argue for abandoning
originalism in statutory interpretation and adopting judicial candor in its place).
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trading decisions on the basis of presented information. The
contrasting image of the investor bound up in a web of cognitive
illusions and processing deficiencies, with little appetite for the
truth, offers the discouraging possibility that many traditional
strategies of investor protection may not be worth the cost. The
efficiency hypothesis and noise theory,,when stated in the extreme,
lead to similar end points: forms of regulation that are seen as
either unnecessary burdens or quixotic waste.
2 12
In this light, efficiency thinking to the courts may not be so
appealing because it is descriptively persuasive, but because it is a
preferable normative vision, better in keeping with the fundamental-
ly rationalist worldview that has animated regulatory theory-
publicly, at least-since its inception. 213 People may not be ratio-
nal investors, but they should be. The temptation to mold the
doctrine in the image of the ideal is strong, especially if the
implications of reality are more intellectually chaotic than we are
comfortable to admit.
III. CONCLUSION: THE EFFICIENCY HEURISTIC
AND THE SCHOLAR'S GAMBLE
Our study of the impact of the efficient market hypothesis on
securities regulation may be surprising given the common percep-
tion of its significance. The efficiency hypothesis is embedded in
regulation, but as often as not it is as facade rather than as
structure. Frequently, it is used to make the largely uncontroversial
point that the securities markets respond quickly to information,
true or false, informally disseminated or contained in filings. The
principal regulatory initiatives cited as efficiency-based-the
integrated disclosure effort, Rule 415, and the fraud-on-the-market
theory-fall into this category. Strong claims about efficiency are
neither necessary nor sufficient to legitimize them; each has virtues
that would be plain under any realistic theory about how markets
212 See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1164-70 (1970) (arguing that complex disclosure documents
confuse investors and that for intelligent investors to become informed they must
obtain information second-hand, via professionals).
213 As noted earlier, there are large portions of securities regulation that even
strong believers in market efficiency would support, with some possible modifications,
such as a system of mandatory disclosure as a form of public good. See supra note 76
and accompanying text.
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operate. Greater acceptance of noise as a significant market
phenomenon would not be cause to reject them.
That makes the ultimate question posed at the outset of part II-
what posture should the law adopt in light of the new-found
ambiguity-somewhat easier, since there is less to rethink. Properly
understood, efficiency remains a useful heuristic, an analytical
structure for thinking about markets. Claims in legal proceedings
that are inconsistent with efficiency theory (in Apple-type cases, for
example) should be scrutinized carefully in light of the theory's
teachings to test for their plausibility. Beyond that, however, they
should not operate preclusively.2 14 Claimants should be permit-
ted to base factual arguments on the assumption that markets are
noisy, and legal theories should be sufficiently agnostic regarding
stock price behavior so as not to preclude the noisy view unless
some independent normative grounds exist for doing so. 215 With
respect to measuring damages, continued use of efficiency-based
models can be justified on pragmatic grounds unless and until some
alternative valuation model evolves.
The only real cause for concern in the current state of securities
regulation is rhetorical.2 16 Whatever the substantive or political
motivations, statements regarding efficiency in the process of policy
formulation are frequently stronger and less careful than they
should be. The danger is that a new wave of SEC and judicial policy
214 Some scholars heavily influenced by economic thinking have suggested, by
reference to something like an intellectual version of the child's game "king of the
hill," that it "takes a theory to beat a theory." See Fischel, supra note 147, at 915. For
this reason alone the efficiency hypothesis should continue to drive legal thinking
until the behavioralists come up with a formal, validated model of their own. See Fred
S. McChesney, Assumptions, Empirical Evidence and Social Science Method, 96 YALE L.J.
339, 341 (1986) (arguing that no alternative hypothesis or test has been forwarded
rejecting an efficiency model). With respect to the efficiency hypothesis, at least, this
depends on the assumption that the testing of the hypothesis has given it sufficient
support to deserve prima facie validity. That, of course, is a controversial assumption.
The idea that law must be based on the best-tested social scientific theory, no matter
what the level of doubt accompanying it (or that no form of regulation should exist
unless based on a scientifically validated theory), employs a method of legal reasoning
that is hardly mainstream and is exceedingly political.
215 Denying recovery to plaintiffs in fraud-on-the-market cases where there might
have been a noisy response to certain false signals, notwithstanding the public
availability of accurate information, may represent such a case. See supra text
accompanying note 194.
216 On the rhetorical significance of economic-type arguments, see Donald N.
McCloskey, The Consequences of Rhetoric, in THE CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC
RHETORIC 280, 283-92 (Arjo Klamer et al. eds., 1988); Donald N. McCloskey, The
Rhetoric of Law and Economics, 86 MICH. L. REv. 752, 752-67 (1988).
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making may thoughtlessly reify this rhetoric, in areas such as the
regulation of takeovers or the role of shareholder monitoring. •
Whether this happens will depend partly on the community of
academic legal scholars who operate as the primary filtration
mechanism for research in econ6mics and finance. As was noted.at
the outset, the efficiency hypothesis is firmly entrenched in the
mainstream legal literature.2 17 There have been occasional cri-
tiques, such as Reinier Kraakman's explicit use of noise theory to
caution against too much certainty one way or another in choosing
the proper regulatory posture toward takeovers. 218 On balance,
however, the best scholarship in corporate and securities law has yet
to venture very far from the orthodoxy of efficient markets, a
contrast to the noticeable diversity in the contemporary economics
literature from which it supposedly derives.
Even more surprising, perhaps, is the equally noticeable
reluctance of corporate/securities scholars to make any serious use
of the behavioral literature on decision-making under uncertainty.
While this literature has made a substantial impact in other legal
fields-Robert Ellickson has gone so far as to suggest that legal
scholarship is on the verge of a generic shift from the influence of
economics to the influence of the behavioral sciences2 19-it is
rarely mentioned in the corporate subspeciality. When it is, it is
usually footnote material.2 20 Yet the relevance of behavioral
217 See supra note 2-6 and accompanying text.
218 See Kraakman, supra note 11. Earlier, Louis Lowenstein invoked the teachings
of some of the noise theorists in his critique of the pro-takeover movement. See Louis
Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 249 (1983).
219 See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors:
A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 35-55 (1989). For
representative uses in other fields, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred
Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant With the Economic and
Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083,
1112-18 (1984) (noting that the homebuyer is not a wealth-maximizing decision-
maker, but rather an imperfect shopper and suboptimal decision-maker); Thomas H.
Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1410-14
(1985) (discussing the problem of "incomplete heuristics," which may lead an
individual to favor present consumption despite a different set of long-term desires
and goals); Roger G. Noll &James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology
for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEG. STUD. 747, 760-79 (1990) (considering some of the
implications of the cognitive theory for regulatory policies designed to control risks
to life, health, and the environment). See generally Matthew L. Spitzer, Comment on
Noll and Krier, "Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation," 19J. LEG.
STUD. 801 (1990) (discussing the usefulness of cognitive theory in legal analysis).
220 A conventional statement of the reasons why it is not directly relevant to
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literature to questions of business organization and finance is
palpable, and we have seen that economists have been making use
of it in the enterprise setting for at least five or six years.
2 21
A good example is the debate that produced some of the best
recent writing in this area: the one share-one vote controversy
about whether the law should allow shareholders to authorize
disparate voting structures that effectively separate the financial and
voting interests in a firm's ownership structure.222 The controver-
corporate law can be found in Romano, supra note 38, at 324-27. For some of the
more recent uses, however, see, e.g., Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1418 n.35 (1985) (noting
that the operation of assorted heuristics and biases tend to leave individuals with
illusions of control over future contingencies);John C. Coffee,Jr., Shareholders Versus
Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MicH. L. REv. 1, 60-73 (1986)
(discussing the problem of risk for shareholders, employees, and the state in the"
corporate setting); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1461, 1465 (1989) (asserting that corporations by their nature involve a form
of activity in which uncertainty plays a vital role); Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and
Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 330 (1990) (noting
the "prospect theory" model, which entails that real people are risk-adverse in choices
involving gains and are risk-seeking in choices involving losses). Although they do not
draw heavily on the cognitive-illusion literature, Cox & Munsinger make very
significant use of materials from social psychology. See James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of
Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85-108 (1985) (discussing the
social and psychological causes of board of directors' bias). By contrast, evidence of
social psychology's minimal influence can be found rather dramatically in reviewing
the proceedings of a Columbia Law School conference debating the contractual view
of corporate law. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989) (introducing the conference papers).
Apart from brief mention in Mel Eisenberg's contribution, supra, there is no
reference to the behavioral literature. Even scholars not traditionally associated with
law and economics sometimes make fairly strong claims about rationality and market
efficiency. See, e.g., Eliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and
Indeterminacy: A Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 551, 589-90 (1987) (discussing the limits of the market model).
221 See supra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
222 For articles opposing the disparate-voting-structure proposal, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on
CharterAmendments, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1820,1848-60 (1989) (discussing the desirable
limits on and the optimal corporate arrangement for permitting opting-out in
midstream); RonaldJ. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of
Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 815-44 (1987) (noting that wealth impact of dual-class
recapitalization can be tested by comparing premiums paid in management buy-outs);
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of
Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 39-42 (1988) (contending that shareholder
approval of a dual-class common recapitalization does not necessarily support a belief
that those actions increase shareholder wealth). The conventional pro-choice law and
economics view is expressed best in Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the
Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 133-48 (1987)
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sy was vigorously mooted, with those taking the negative point-of-
view raising questions about the adequacy of information and the
collective action problems that can lead to distorted choices.
223
Yet even this view was rationalist at heart. No one considered in
any detail whether there were influences in the way that information
is perceived and processed that might distort shareholder choice.
Why has the behavioralist critique had so little influence? One
possibility is lack of familiarity. But that is becoming less and less
plausible given its prominent display in the economics journals and
the speed with which other novel developments in economic theory
move into the legal arena. More likely, there are deeper explana-
tions.
By all accounts, the integration of economics and finance theory
into corporate law during the late 1970s and early 1980s brought it
to the forefront of quality legal scholarship generally.224 The use
(discussing the economics of shareholder voting and the criteria that determine
whether a rule of one share, one vote or dual classes is optimal for a particular firm).
From the economist's perspective, see SanfordJ. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 175, 182-95
(1988) (setting forth an economic model to analyze some of the forces that make it
desirable to set up a corporation so that all securities possess voting strength in
proportion to the claim to income). Ian Ayres's thoughtful article on the fraud-on-
the-market theory, see Ayres, supra note 11, is an example of an expression of concern
about at least fundamental value market efficiency, while at the same time working
with a rationalist regime in advocating an opt-out approach to the duty of truthful-
ness.
22s This view was cited by the SEC in its adoption of Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.19c-4 (1990), which prohibited most forms of mid-stream recapitalization that
had the effect of disproportionately reducing shareholder voting power. The rule was
later struck down by the D.C. Circuit. See Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,
417 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For articles supporting this view, see supra note 222.
In many ways, Rule 19c-4 was an implicit Commission endorsement of investor
rationality, if not the efficiency hypothesis. This was evidenced by its willingness to
allow disparate voting rights in initial public offerings based on the assumption that
the absence of voting rights would be fairly priced, a choice supported by Gilson,
supra note 222, at 808-09. But see Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A
Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 979, 985-1014
(1989) (criticizing SEC Rule 19c-4 and arguing that the SEC should not permit the
sale of voting rights).
224 In its first stages, the use of economics was particularly effective in its critical
capacity to generate unexpected insights and to force more traditional scholars to
seek to explain or negate these possibilities-forcing a far greater rigor on the field.
This highly mathematical use of economic theory does not depend heavily on the
reality of the underlying assumptions, since it does not itself purport to offer a
positive normative position. See Jason S. Johnston, Law, Economics, and Post-Realist
Explanation, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV. 1217, 1232 (1990). Nothing here is meant to be
critical of the use of a rationalist paradigm in making legal arguments, as long as it
is used carefully.
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of simple models to predict behavior allowed legal scholars to make
bold, unambiguous claims that often challenged long-standing
convention. Issues about how firms are organized and financed
could fruitfully be reconceptualized, sometimes radically. Perhaps
most significantly, efficient market assumptions allowed scholars to
use the event study to provide prompt feedback regarding the
wealth-shift consequences of various forms of regulation. 225 With
this evolution came apparent, and sometimes even real, influence
and a new intellectual hierarchy.2
Both the behavioralist critique and noise theory call into
question some of the first principles underlying these models.' As
in lengthy, arduous negotiations so familiar to business lawyers
where one party suddenly suggests a return to square one, such
suggestions are rarely greeted kindly. In the preface to the second
edition of his book on scientific revolutions referred to earlier,
Thomas Kuhn noted that academic specialties form "invisible
colleges," essential to the dissemination of knowledge, but also
imposing a discipline on appropriate modes of thinking; a discipline
that grows increasingly certain and conservative over time.227 The
225 See generally StephenJ. Brown &Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns:
The Case of Event Studies, 14J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1985) (examining the properties of daily
stock returns and how characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies
for assessing share price impact); G. William Schwert, UsingFinancial Data to Measure
Effects of Regulation, 24J.L. & EcON. 121, 121 (1981) (noting that positive analysis of
government regulation concentrates on the "wealth effects" of regulation). For
illustrations of the pervasive character of reliance on event studies, see the various
articles on the one-share/one-vote controversy cited supra note 222. The tendency
to over-rely on event studies regarding non-firm-specific information has been
criticized by at least one commentator. See Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market
Model in Corporate Law Analysis, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015, 1015-18, 1041-46 (1988); see
also Gibbons, supra note 44, at 37-38 (questioning the reliability of event study
methodologies in the area of regulation economics).
226 Early on, at least, the influence of the new elite in corporate law scholarship
was enhanced by high barriers to entry; relatively few legal academics or practitioners
had the expertise in economics and finance to operate as effective filters. Cf. Ian
Ayres, Playing Games With the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291, 1295-1310 (1990) (book
review) (describing a similar phenomenon with respect to game theory in legal
settings).
227 KUHN, supra note 30, at 176; see DIANE CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES: DIFFUSION
OF KNOWLEDGE IN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES 22-40 (1972). Kuhn also emphasizes a
tendency for models to move toward simplicity and abstraction as they grow older
with a consequent loss of realism. See KUHN, supra note 30, at 155-56; see also Robert
C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1703, 1735-36 (1989) (noting the possibility of persistent social illusions with
reference to corporate law). The tendency toward theoretical simplicity in the
biomedical sciences-with its risks to investors induced to buy into start-up companies
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interesting question, echoing a long-standing concern among
psychologists in similar instances, is whether the efficiency paradigm
is a persistent heuristic because of its descriptive accuracy, or simply
because legal scholars desperately want it to be accurate.
The behavioralist critique is unappealing in many ways. As
Shiller has noted, it is hard to model a partially rational person in
a way that generates testable predictions.228  Accepting the cri-
tique does not often lead to grand theories or confident assertions
about optimal legal structures. It is largely descriptive in nature,
not simple, or rigorous, or aesthetically elegant.229  Its conclu-
sions point mildly to the possibility that quasi-paternalistic regulato-
ry intervention might be desirable in a number of settings but then
immediately create doubts about the efficacy of the traditional legal
strategies that might be used,23 0 thereby raising unpleasant recol-
lections of the highly impressionistic, polemical style of corporate
law scholarship that once predominated.
Nor can we ignore the political dimension. Strong claims of
market efficiency and investor rationality usually carry with them an
endorsement of the laissez faire.231  We also noted earlier that
whose work is based largely on theory-is examined in TEITELMAN, supra note 4, at
200-09.
228 See SHILLER, MARKET VOLTILiTY, supra note 49, at 435. This is really a
comparative point. Kahneman and Tversky, for instance, have developed a concept
called "prospect theory" regarding decisions under uncertainty, and that theory can
be used as the basis for making interesting behavioral claims. See Kahneman &
Tversky, supra note 19, at 160-62, 173; see also Noll & Krier, supra note 219 (building
a model of the political demand for risk regulation using prospect theory).
Compared to the rationalist paradigm, however, theories of suboptimal behavior
create greater ambiguity regarding the actions of large groups (such as investors in
markets).
229 Aesthetics may play a role in determining what academics value. See Mark
Kelman, Spitzerand Hoffman on Coase: A Brief Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215,1221
(1980) (noting the aesthetic pleasure we get from economic theories like the Coase
Theorem); Janice Toran, 'Tis a Gift to be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89
MICH. L. REV. 352, 355, 363-70 (1990) (advancing the hypothesis that aesthetic
considerations play a role in the formulation of new legal procedures and the
preference for one procedure over another).
230 A good illustration of this is the debate over information overload-whether
providing consumers with too much information produces suboptimal decisions. See
Grether et al., supra note 29, at 277-80; Scott, supra note 29, at 329-32. Providing
information, of course, is the classic strategy of federal securities regulation.
231 See William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical
Appraisal, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 407,432-46 (1989) (recognizing the political element
of much economics-oriented legal scholarship in corporate law). For a fairly candid
recognition of the political biases in various forms of legal scholarship, seeJonathan
R. Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces Versus the
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some of the influence of efficiency-based thinking (and thinkers)
may be not only the product of substantive merit but also of
commodity value in rationalizing potentially wealth-shifting forms
of deregulation.2 3 2 Although good academics will not consciously
alter their writings simply because certain styles or conclusions are
in demand, no one can expect the production of strong normative
claims to cease as long as they are generating positive abnormal
returns.
It is likely, therefore, that cognitive dissonance will prevent the
corporate/securities literature from readily embracing the caution-
ary teachings of the behavioralists or the doubts about market
efficiency. If behavioral economics itself turns out to be something
of a fad, with subsequent reversion to conventional efficiency
ideology, that is fine. If not, the cost comes in terms of foregone
opportunities to check the influence of rhetorical overstatement
hinted at in some of the cases and SEC releases, and to present a
view of the investing process that, though somewhat chaotic and
inelegant, has the appeal of realism.
There is something else as well. If the behavioralists have a valid
point and the markets do not effectively filter out cognitive biases
and imperfections, we will be forced to confront, at this rather late
date in the intellectual history of securities regulation, how little we
really know about how and why people invest.233  Claims of
market efficiency carry the orthodox view that so long as the test
results continue to support the hypothesis, the study of whether
investor behavioral traits are likely to be as rational as assumed is
beside the point. If the test results, however, do not provide
unambiguous support, and no acceptable alternative theoretical
construct to the efficiency hypothesis evolves, there is little choice
but to concede the possibility of suboptimal behavior and try to
gauge its degree empirically. This will be necessary if we are to gain
insight into the workings of the capital markets and seriously assess
the costs and benefits of the regulatory structure.
234
Policymaker's Dilemma, 96 YALE LJ. 342 (1986), and McChesney, supra note 214. Both
articles are responses to Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense
Tactics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE LJ. 295 (1986).
252 See supra text accompanying notes 114-17.
233 See supra text accompanying notes 94-160.
234 See SHILLER, supra note 49, at 435-37. This would encompass both laboratory-
type experiments and survey-type investigations. For some examples of the former,
see Paul B. Andreassen, On the Social Psychology of the Stock Market: Aggregate
Attributional Effects and the Regressiveness of Prediction, 53 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
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We have extensive price/performance studies of public
offerings, but little data on the purchasers in such offerings that
seeks to explain their motivations, the relevance to them of the
mandatory disclosures, or the content and influence of sales and
marketing communications that seem to play such a role in their
success. Similarly, we know surprisingly little about who buys or
sells in the stock market (and why) during various phases of a
significant price move. Moreover, very little is known about the
level of portfolio diversification and attitudes toward risk among
individual investors, 235 or the organizational and moral hazard
influences on trading behavior in institutions.23 6  For many
reasons, we have gambled on a simplifying theory that allows us not
to worry too much about questions like these in making judgments
about securities law. But at some point, the dice will stop rolling,
and intellectually, it will be time to settle up.
PSYCHOL. 490 (1987); Camerer, supra note 38, at 981-82; Vernon L. Smith et al.,
Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56
ECONOMETRICA 1119, 1121-22 (1988); see also Paul Slovic, Analyzing the Expert Judge:
A Descriptive Study of a Stockbroker's Decision Processes, 53J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 255, 256-
58 (1968) (describing an illustration of the analysis-of-variance technique to depict the
use of information by persons making complex judgments); Paul Slovic et al.,
Analyzing the Use of Information in Investment Decision Making A Methodological Proposal,
45 J. Bus. 283, 283-90 (1972) (detailing previous research and methods describing
how complex investment decisions are made). The general issue is addressed in
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An
Introduction, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 991, 1018-19 (1985) (discussingstudies, for example,
showing that individuals are willing to bid more for a good than they would actually
be willing to pay for the same good if asked). Nothing here is meant to understate
the difficulties inherent in doing either of these kinds of studies or translating the
results into policy. See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value
of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1009 (1989)
(proposing a framework in which both scientific and nonscientific social inquiry can
be assessed and utilized by legal decision-makers).
235 Some of the behavioral literature suggests that people may develop mental
accounts of assets as a heuristic device and adopt sig.iificantly different attitudes
toward risk depending on the current status of the account. See Richard H. Thaler,
Savings, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, 4J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1990, at 193, 194-
203. On diversification, see French & Poterba, supra note 57, at 222-25.
236 Moral hazard problems, high personnel turnover, and the rapid proliferation
of new financial products that might interfere with effective learning, among other
influences, may well lead to suboptimal decision-making even in institutional settings,
but their role is largely unexplored. See iupra notes 44 & 58. Cf Edward B. Rock,
The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J.
445, 468-72 (1991) (emphasizing the moral hazard problem in explaining why
institutional shareholder activism may be less than expected).
